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ABSTRACT 
 
TATE O’GARA GOULD: A longitudinal analysis of the effects of collective 
bargaining on interstate teacher salary differences from 1960 to 2000 
(Under the direction of Dr. Carol Malloy) 
 
 
 The current study examined how collective bargaining provisions affected 
average teacher salary trends for states from 1960 to 2000, after controlling for 
various economic, social, and demographic variables.  Results show that collective 
bargaining had a significant, but waning, effect on teacher pay increases over the 40 
year period with slight effects found in the 1970s after the initial organization of 
unions.  Further, results show this effect in certain regions, but not others.  Finally, 
results show that after controlling for other factors, the difference in teacher pay 
between collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining states has changed little 
over the last 40 years.  Any increases experienced in the collective bargaining states 
were also experienced in the latter, either simultaneously or shortly thereafter.   
This study is the first interstate historical comparison of teacher pay that 
controls for teacher educational attainment and experience over a 40 year period, as 
well as adjusting for inflation and cost of living.  The implications for this 
comprehensive and innovative approach calls for a refocusing of research on teacher 
salaries such that these findings combined with other studies of similar rigor and 
depth will be able to better inform educational policy decisions.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION OF PROBLEM 
 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Teacher compensation remains an anvil for educational reform.  Consuming a 
majority of the public education expenditure budget, the issues of wages and 
benefits act as a bottleneck, not just financially but politically, consuming the 
attention of policy makers, teacher unions, and politicians (Lankford, Ochshorn, & 
Wycoff, 1996; Thornton, 1971).  Despite decades of pressure from teacher advocates 
to increase teacher salaries to “just” or acceptable levels, incremental wage increase 
has been the standard practice in most districts since the nineteenth century.  Sub-
standard teacher pay exists despite a wealth of research that connects adequate 
wages to positive teacher motivation (Frase, 1992; Schein, 2003), successful teacher 
recruitment and retention (Murnane & Olsen, 1990), and improved professional 
status (Goodson & Hargreaves, 1996; Johnson & Donaldson, 2006).  The issue of 
compensation has prompted several reform efforts such as bonus incentives, pay for 
outstanding performance, and career advancement.  Still, most initiatives manage to 
incite more newspaper headlines than school officials’ embracement of new policies.  
Teachers are the largest profession in the United States and the issue inherently 
draws several stakeholders into the debate (Murnane & Olsen, 1990).   
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The issue of teacher pay is complicated based on its intertwining with 
community, business, and politics.  A ceiling remains suspended over the issue of 
compensation because teachers are primarily paid through public tax dollars. Any 
substantial pay increase would likely involve a significant tax hike for citizens.  
Meanwhile, parents and students are perpetually affected by a troubling teacher 
attrition rate.  Almost fifty percent of new teachers leave the profession within five 
years, creating staffing instability in many schools; especially in critical needs 
and/or specialty areas where instructor turnover persists.  The bottom line is that 
teacher consistency enables student success, but under the current compensation 
system1, a pay increase must benefit all teachers, regardless of the publicly perceived 
quality of the teacher, which sometimes leads to less collective public support for 
substantial teacher pay increases.   
A teacher’s role and the pedagogical delivery of a curriculum appears relatively 
similar regardless of the area, region, or state, however, there is significant 
difference in the amount of monetary compensation.  Compared to the private 
business sector, such pay differences are commonplace. Various industries 
supplement salaries due to increases in product sales, faster production times, or 
labor pressure. In the public sector, specifically in education, reasons for pay 
variation remain less apparent.  Some equate higher pay with a more qualified 
                                                 
1 The terms wages, salaries, and compensation are used interchangeably in this report, following the style of 
several similar studies that are referenced.  Some economists differentiate among the three, with compensation 
including fringe benefits and amenities and wages measured as pay by the hour.  For this report, much like 
others in the field, all three terms will assume to be describing the annual salary paid to a teacher, ignoring 
benefits. 
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teacher workforce, resulting in better education.  Others assume that teacher pay is 
greater in wealthier districts because these particular school districts can access 
larger budgets.  If schools are financed by public tax dollars, usually property taxes, 
then areas with greater tax bases can afford to pay their teachers more in order to 
attract and recruit.   
Perhaps the only assumption concerning wages that has been studied is the 
existence of teacher unions and their subsequent impact on the fluctuation of wages.  
For example, both service sector and auto industry unions have pressured 
management to increase worker pay-- often with great success.  The impact of 
unions regarding the teaching profession remains overshadowed by conflicting local 
and state and political interests.  Studies can be politically motivated; in some 
instances research serves as a defense for union advocates. On the other hand 
studies may seek to discredit unions. In either case, skewed outcomes gravitate 
towards supporting a specific political agenda as opposed to exploring or 
questioning union’s efficacy.  In essence, research may dissect and present collected 
data supporting one extreme or another.  Studies concerning the overall 
effectiveness of union influence on teacher pay allow no exception to the debate.   
 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This study intends to research the longitudinal effects of the labor movement 
on teacher pay among the various states.  In this longitudinal quantitative study, I 
incorporated research on selective regional adjustments, a methodology that 
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postdates the majority of previous research of teacher pay.  Moreover, because the 
issue of teacher wages involves many stakeholders not limited to those actively 
participating in the profession, I examined and included several factors that have 
contributed to the widely varying pay trends nationwide.  By employing updated, 
comprehensive statistical methods, I balanced and organized the staggering 
complexity of interaction among these variables, generating a clearer understanding 
for how the union movement has affected teacher pay over a half century.   
The dataset includes 40 years of state level statistics dealing with various 
aspects of teacher pay.  These factors were pulled from economic, labor, and social 
data sets and covered the following eras of educational reform: unionization of the 
teacher force in the 1960s, the teacher accountability movement beginning in the 
1980s, and the rise of the “education governors” in the last two decades.    From this 
dataset, I explored the following research questions: 
• How do the collective bargaining laws affect teacher pay in the last 40 years, 
after controlling for the influences of social and economic forces? 
• How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on teacher pay, 
controlling for the influence of social and economic forces, differ over various 
eras in school reform?  
• How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on teacher pay, 
controlling for social and economic forces, differ by region of the country 
over the past 40 years? 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Teacher salaries continue to be a much politicized and debated issue in the 
education field.  Undoubtedly, selfless dedication and commitment are obvious 
traits inherent to longevity in the teaching profession.   More often than not, it 
becomes almost commonplace to assume that monetary compensation should be 
accepted at face value.  In other words teaching is primarily viewed as an altruistic 
profession; that is, collectively, teaching professionals are humble, civil servants. The 
idea of teaching monetary for gain is, in some cases, perceived as frivolous. This 
stereotype can be traced back to the days of the one- room schoolhouse when 
teachers “boarded ‘round,” exchanging teaching services for free room and board 
and little if any pay (NEA Salary Committee & Evenden, 1923).  But the professional 
status of the classroom teacher has evolved into a prominent occupational role in 
our society.  Teaching is a legitimately recognized profession and those in and 
around the education community consistently voice the need for equal and fair 
compensation.   
Too often, high attrition rates plague the professional fate of many new 
teachers (Murphy, 1990).  Teachers’ grievances extend beyond what comprises gross 
earnings in a paycheck.  Teachers have continually sought a revamped image of 
professionalism and respect in society, but understand that compensation is closely 
connected (Goodson & Hargreaves, 1996; Lagemann, 2000).  Thus, compensation 
issues are crucial when discussing issues of teacher retention or an instructor’s 
overall satisfaction and success in the workplace. 
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Understanding how unions affect salary increases has been an area of interest 
in many facets of research, however, the implemented methods as well as the access 
to recently-released historical data place this study at the forefront of understanding 
unions and their influence on teacher salaries.  Collective bargaining has been the 
primary method of negotiation in the last 50 years and teacher salary increases have 
been a “litmus test” for unions’ success.  Despite some of the initial criticism that 
unions receive, many teachers feel at bare minimum, “at least we are paid better 
than if there were no unions.”  Quantifying this difference in pay versus situations 
where unions are nonexistent has been difficult to parlay into a research model.  
Often times, the interpretation of specific data is limited to a narrow chronological 
window.  Placing unions at the focal point of a study often initiates 
apprehensiveness from union advocates. Conversely, union critics may seize the 
opportunity to seek flaws in union’s overall effectiveness, judged merely on the 
gains sought in pay.  Regardless, the function of teacher unions remains more 
politically volatile and complex than the tempered politics of teacher salaries. 
Extensive consideration and research must attempt to balance extrinsic political 
motivations with an educator’s desire for fair wage. 
 This study relies on more recent methodological developments that consider 
detailed regional adjustments.  Homogenized generalizations and snapshots of 
national statistical average cannot provide a diversified interpretation of the data. In 
addition, the research includes more contemporary methods of inquiries related to 
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overall disparity concerning teacher salaries.  These trends appear to influence 
research in accordance with specific past social and political issues.   
The first research wave occurred in the 1940s following the wave of 
implementation of the single salary schedule.  Researchers were curious about 
causes, trends and fluctuations in monetary compensation after 99 percent of the 
nation’s school districts evolved from a standard, differential pay structure, which 
discriminated based on race and gender.   The single salary schedule attempted to 
rectify this flaw by paying teachers based on education level and years of teaching 
experience.  The second wave of research occurred in the 1970s which sought to 
understand the effect of collective bargaining on the education public sector 
(Fournier & Rasmussen, 1986).  These laws encouraged teachers to unionize and 
employ traditional labor strategies to improve pay and work conditions.  The third 
and most recent research wave follows the teacher accountability movement in the 
1980s.  Policy makers and the general public placed additional pressure on school 
officials to audit educational expenditures and their effects on student achievement 
and success.  Each historical wave capitalizes on evolving and improved statistical 
methodologies as well as a further understanding of the complexities attempting to 
determine the quantitative value of teachers’ wages.   
In order to examine this subject using quantitative approaches, the methods 
must be capable of balancing the delicate complexity of how labor, social, 
educational, and economic factors combine and interact.  Understandably, this kind 
of study must be coupled with a qualitative approach to further comprehend and 
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extract conclusions when compared with quantitative trends and correlations.  The 
study will act as the first step toward unraveling previous historical events which 
underlie the research trends and conclusions that have affected decades of statistics 
collected on the topic.  
Through this study, I capitalized on several improvements used to interpret 
to the cost of living research.  Although common assumption implies that certain 
cost variations exist between services and goods in different regions (commonly 
referred to as the “cost of living index”), the statistical application of these indices 
was problematic and controversial even up to the 1990s. These methods interpreted 
based on costs of consumer goods and land valuations, ignoring variables specific to 
the education profession and related work conditions.  Furthermore, cost of living 
theory only recently has been applied to the field of education, which does not 
follow the typical trends in a market-based, private economy (Chambers, 1995; 
Fournier & Rasmussen, 1986).  Researchers have only recently begun to understand 
the applications and limitations of cost of living comparisons to the field.  
Finally, I constructed one of the most extensive and comprehensive state-level 
data sets encompassing statistics specifically related to teacher wages.  These 
statistics predated many educational compensation reforms, such as the evolution of 
teacher pay, unionization, and the accountability movement.  A cross-sectional 
approach that includes collecting data during every one year or even ten years 
merely provides a researcher a snapshot in time. I offer a complete history of state 
teacher compensation during the last 40 years.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 Interpreting teacher salary trends has been thoroughly researched but 
continues to elude researchers as to specific factors contributing to differences in pay 
(Lankford & Wyckoff, 1997).  As outlined earlier, researching teacher salary 
emulates waves of contrasting critical trends that shape the basis of educational 
reform.  Economists and education researchers remain conscious of the impact on 
teacher salaries in relation to society: public education accounts for almost half the 
state spending while teacher salaries and employee benefits consume almost eighty 
percent the education budget (Podgursky, 2004).  The weight of public funding 
education draws attention from policymakers, politicians, economists, public 
taxpayers, and powerful teacher associations.  Because of these influences, teacher 
salary research is often characterized by the view of public education in the public 
eye.   
The following literature review accomplishes four objectives: 1) to 
demonstrate the political nature surrounding teacher salaries, the involvement of 
several stakeholders in the process, and how these influences can be studied in the 
current analyses,  2) review the research on teacher unions, categorizing the three 
most dominant debates in teacher labor literature: professional, gender, and the 
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legal debate, 3) review the statistical findings relating teacher unions to salaries, 
covering the quantitative and qualitative findings from previous researchers, and 4) 
argue for necessary improvements while studying differences amongst teachers’ 
salaries, showing that an informed perspective facilitates the greater understanding 
of union’s effect as well as an improvement for what variables should be considered 
in examining teacher wages.  
 
POLITICS OF THE TEACHER SALARY ISSUE 
 The politics of teacher pay is perhaps one of most underrated issues in 
education today.  It accounts for most of a district’s budget and is a substantial 
investment for localities and states.  The issue draws in large numbers of 
stakeholders, not just based on the public funding for education, but based on the 
role schools play in our society.  (Brimelow, 2003; Lankford, Ochshorn, & Wycoff, 
1996; Murnane, Singer, & Willett, 1987).  Employers in most occupations demand 
highly skilled and trained workers (Goodson, 2003).  Programs funded by state or 
local tax dollars can be hampered by the enormous budgets of education.  Political 
leaders are pressured by one of the largest and most powerful lobbying groups at all 
levels of governments - teacher unions, which devote their attention to funding 
issues of its memberships (Lieberman, 1997).  The issue affects multiple special 
interest groups and invites several players to the negotiation table. 
 Perhaps the first time teacher pay became a national issue was in the early 
1900s with the Chicago Teacher Tax Crusade in the 1900s.  Inspired by school 
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teachers (Haley, 1904), Chicago teachers became frustrated with their demand for 
fair wages.  Teachers’ voices were ignored and their interests were consistently 
dismissed.  As a result, teachers joined forces with local labor leaders and uncovered 
almost $2 million in unpaid corporate taxes, helping to fund teacher salary raises 
and spark several similar battles in other large city school districts. The mostly 
female groups demanded just and equal pay similar to their male coworkers for 
doing the same work (Murphy, 1990).  The eventual adoption of the single salary 
system helped eliminate discriminatory pay, however, the debate continued over 
low teacher pay relative to other professions’ salaries (Goodson & Hargreaves, 1996; 
Shen & Hsieh, 1999).   
In order to appease both the growing frustration of teachers under the 
differential pay plan, as well as ease the managerial headaches for administrators as 
schools consolidated, public schools adopted the single salary schedule.  The 
adoption of this new schedule purported to pay all teachers the same, regardless of 
race and gender.  Emphasizing years of experience and levels of education, the 
single salary schedule became the fixture for teacher pay, and it remains the primary 
determinant of payment in almost every school district in the country (Podgursky, 
2004).  A limited wave of research followed this reform.  Researchers attempted to 
understand the trends in teacher pay following this national reform movement.  
Because of the limited data collected and the lack of modern statistical methods, this 
research is rarely cited or referenced in later studies.  It does mark in time a growing 
scrutiny of public spending on education (Davis, 1943; Elsbree, 1941).  Two 
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observations were made during this period.  First, the role that teachers perform is 
similar across most of the United States; yet, the salaries were remarkably different 
across districts, regions, and states (Bechdolt, 1942).  Second, although several 
factors are attributed to the varying levels of pay, compensation needs to be adapted 
for living adjustments which account for the varying cost of goods and services in 
different parts of the country (Borgersrode, 1942; Davis, 1943; Staffelbach, 1942).  The 
latter observation predated the extensive cost of living indices that were developed 
in the 1970s, and thus remained a suggestion for future inquiry. 
Advocates for teacher pay initiative received a significant boost when states 
began allowing public sector workers to unionize in the 1960s.  Within a decade, a 
majority of the states allowed their teachers to unionize (Fuller, Mitchell, & 
Hartman, 2000).  Although many challenges were placed in front of teacher unions, 
such as improving work conditions and reducing class sizes, the issue of increasing 
teacher wages and benefits would serve as the barometer of success for their 
existence (Duplantis, Chandler, & Geske, 1995; Freeman & Medoff, 1979; Hoxby, 
1996; Murphy, 1990; National Education Association, 1969).   Much like the 
successes found in the labor movements of the private industry, the teacher union 
movement sought to obtain similar successes in obtaining just and fair pay for its 
members.   
 Besides the financial burden, research points to a growing issue between 
districts and states: teacher recruitment.  Policymakers are constantly pressured to 
increase teacher salaries with little or no knowledge about the "market price" for 
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teacher salaries; they usually compare national averages in order to gauge salaries. 
This power this has been proven to be highly inaccurate benchmark based on the 
number of regional differences that exist.  In an era of increasing worker mobility, 
districts and states lure teacher candidates based on salaries and benefits (Einhorn, 
2001).  This competitiveness presides at both local and state levels, so much so that 
the state comparison issue has become more on the radar of politicians’ agendas.  
Florida, for example, recently published a scathing report that criticized the national 
reports on state teacher pay which are annually released by the NEA (Florida 
Department of Education & McDougal, 2006).  The “Annual State Rankings” 
criticized the inaccuracies for defining the role of teacher, excluding supplemental or 
bonus pay, and not adjusting for cost of living differences.  State politicians must 
constantly defend (or promote) its average state pay of teachers and with the teacher 
unions making a presence at every election, teacher pay regularly becomes a 
political issue (Odden & Kelly, 1997).  
 
UNIONS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The educational landscape was redrawn by the passing of the federal 1947 
Public Employment Relations Act.  The act granted public workers, including school 
teachers, the ability to unionize which in turn forced open the door for teachers to 
come to the policy table (Johnson & Landman, 2000).  After decades of ignoring and 
marginalizing teachers’ impact in decision making, school boards were forced to 
bargain with unions that were better organized and politically equipped.  Beginning 
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in the 1960s, teachers quickly organized and became one of the most unionized 
professions in the country, as well as one of the most controversial (Hannaway & 
Rotherham, 2006).  Supporters of teachers’ unions point to higher salaries and 
benefits, better working conditions, and a respectable place at the stakeholder table 
(Blackburn & Prandy, 1965; Duplantis, Chandler, & Geske, 1995).  Critics point to an 
added layer of bureaucracy, a slowing of educational reform, and the tendency to 
focus on teacher issues rather than student interests (Brimelow, 2003; Freeman & 
Medoff, 1979).  The political quagmire of teacher unions has severely hampered any 
sustentative scholarly debate (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2006; Loveless, 2000).   
 The current research on the effects of collective bargaining tends to be 
categorized as one of three ongoing debates: professional, social, and legal.  In terms 
of viewing the issues through a professional lens, I review the debate around the 
capacity that unions have contributed to the professional growth of the teaching 
occupation.  From the social lens, I present the limited literature reviewing the effect 
of a female-dominated workforce within a mostly male-managed profession.  
Finally, I review the research on the legal ramifications on teachers, understanding 
the limitations and effects of how “state scope” affects teacher union involvement.   
 
Professional Debate: White versus Blue 
 Unlike the term suggests, teacher unions have not always been classified as a 
coherent, unified organization.  Two separate and competing unions exist: the 
National Education Association (NEA), which tends to behave more like a 
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professional association, and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which 
employs tactics like a traditional labor union.  The following will review the current 
theory on professions and what constitutes a career as a profession versus a trade.  
Then, I review the current works surrounding the impact of unions on the 
professionalization of teachers, highlighting two distinct approaches.  
Understanding the theoretical basis for what defines a profession can better explain 
why teaching endured difficulty garnering acceptance with the same professional 
stature as law or medicine.  However, defining varying levels of professionalism has 
become a contested topic, with the concept stirring up political contention (Casey, 
2006).  Understanding that such contention exists, the following idea provides 
common, recurrent themes that exist in academic literature. 
 The theory of professional development can be described as a tiered process, 
with some referring to it as an “evolutionary stage” of growth (Goodson, 2003).  The 
highest tier of professions is considered the “classical profession,” commonly used 
to define law or medicine.2  These professions are usually highly ranked in terms of 
public status and publicly recognizable (Hargreaves, 2000).  There is a specialized 
knowledge base or shared technical culture, a strong service ethic with a 
commitment to meeting the customer or client's needs.  They are self-regulated and 
defined by collegial powers rather than external bureaucratic control over its 
recruitment and training or its codes of ethics (Hargreaves, 2000).  Although few 
                                                 
2 It is recognized that a difference exists between a profession and a professional.  For instance, Sachs (2003) 
states that one can be considered a professional but still not be a member of a profession.  The term professional 
applies more to how the member exudes a work ethic or commitment to the work.  This distinction is important, 
but will not be debated or discussed in this paper. 
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professions are considered “classical” or elite, an immediate criticism points to the 
value system benefiting more to male workers.  Hence, only male-dominated careers 
tend to be classified as “classical,” and often, female dominated careers are 
considered less-than-elite professional status” (Bascia, 1998). 
If a field is not considered “classical,” according to the literature, it can be 
considered flexible, practical, extended, or complex (Hargreaves, 2000; Soder, 1990; 
Wilensky, 1964).  As listed in that order, they represent a continuum of professional 
organization, with “flexible” being the least rigid or organized and “complex” 
assimilating to many of the principles of a classical profession.  Flexible 
professionalism is rooted in shared or collaborative communities, with scientific 
certainty replaced with situational certainty defined by local groups.  Practical 
professionalism is based on the experiences of its members and places value on 
reflective practice, a common rejection in a university setting where theory is 
derived among the elite thinkers as opposed to the practitioners.  Extended 
professionalism draws on experience coupled with its commitment to theory.  
Finally, complex professionalism derives status through demonstrating the field’s 
complex and intense nature associated with the work.  Illustrating that the trade has 
several levels of complexity, it is inherently worthy of respect in a society (Rowan, 
1994).    
 When applying professional theory to teaching, a “square peg/round hole” 
dilemma exists.  While teaching does have a strong service ethic intrinsic in its 
devotion to academically improving each student's life, public schooling 
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incorporates numerous levels of bureaucratic control based on the funding structure 
and the public involvement.  In terms of developing a "shared technical culture," 
Booth (1988) states that teaching will forever be hampered by the “ordinary 
language” problem: the technical language used in the teaching profession is not 
that different from common language outside the profession.  Rosenholtz (1991) 
further states that teaching will never experience an age of discovery, such as the 
medicine field, which helps to separate a profession from common public 
understanding.  Finally, Ozga (2004) suggests that teachers adopt most of their 
pedagogical practice from either previous experience as a student or trial-by-error 
experiments in their own classrooms, questioning the need of formal training or 
education as in other classical professions.  Based on these observations as well as 
the inherent discrimination of the allowance for a profession to be considered 
“classical,” it is questionable if teaching can ever be considered a classical 
profession. 
 The idea of a “shared technical culture” appears problematic for teaching to 
augment its professional status based on the following three criticisms.  First, 
teaching and its organization, public schools, were incorporated on the pretence of 
local control.  Each school and respective school district is held to a standard of 
accountability by the community.  Similarly, each community must hire teachers, 
resulting in four to five times as many teachers as lawyers and doctors, respectively.  
Rosenholtz (1991) argues that the number of teachers required to teach does not 
allow itself to be secluded or privatized.  The public school system serves the 
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community and thus, all teachers must operate as if held accountable to the 
community.  Second, the teacher’s connection to the community is still an important 
aspect of the profession.  If teachers begin to use technical language that separates 
them from parents or the community, the idea of local control becomes challenged, 
potentially setting up the division between teacher and community, similar to the 
division found in medicine between doctor and patient.  Finally, in order for 
teaching to become self regulated, teachers must be allowed to broaden their job 
descriptions to take on such roles.  Currently, the majority of teaching review is 
performed by an administrator, certification is granted by the state department, and 
mentoring plans are delegated by state legislatures.  Self regulation requires teachers 
to have active (not honorary) decision making powers, yet the current job 
description limits teachers’ involvement outside the classroom (Rowan, 1994).  A 
common rebuttal blames teacher unions for narrowing work details and extra 
duties, ranging from bus supervision to such things as committee work, as well as 
limiting teachers’ potential participation in more decision making roles and 
processes.  
 Teaching has evolved over the years, continually growing in professional 
stature.  Teaching was considered a flexible profession in the days of the one-room 
school house model, with professionalism defined more by the community and the 
teacher’s “moral standing,” rather than scientific theory or rooted pedagogical 
practice (Tyack, 1974).  Once schools began to consolidate, teaching entered a stage 
of practical professionalism based on the similar consolidation of teachers within a 
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similar building.  With the rise of teacher colleges established within the university 
system, teaching began to root itself more in research and theory, and adhered more 
to the principles of extended professionalism.  Teaching reforms following the 
release of the A Nation At Risk, in 1983, appeared to follow the fourth tier of complex 
professionalism.  Reforms such as site based management, merit systems, and career 
ladders established paths to differentiate between teachers’ role assignments.  These 
reforms attempted to add complexity (through additional responsibilities and 
challenges) to the profession of teaching, redefining the idea that teachers “only 
instruct.”  However, this movement insignificantly impacted the profession because 
most of the reforms that increased the complexity of the teacher’s role also increased 
the workload, piling on new obligations along with previous duties.  Certainly, 
reforms such as site based management allowed teachers to demonstrate skills such 
as financial management within a school’s budget; however, proper training for 
these roles was never adequate.  In some districts, teacher unions vehemently 
opposed such reforms, protecting its members from taking on added responsibilities 
which were viewed as managerial (Haar, Lieberman, & Troy, 1994; Johnson & 
Landman, 2000).    
 Looking at the initial missions of the NEA in the late 1800s, there was a 
tendency to model more classic professions. Marshall and Andre-Bechely (in press) 
state that the NEA was original setup as a “national policy making organization,” 
with the creation of a National Council, research divisions, and numerous 
committees appointed to be experts on educational agendas.  Unfortunately, these 
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efforts largely excluded women who held a vast majority of teaching positions 
within the profession. A rift ensued between the policy makers (administrators/ 
men) and the policy doers (teachers/ women).  As the literature suggests, in the 
beginning of the twentieth century, this exclusion as well as rampant discrimination 
within the NEA forced women to seek alternative methods for getting their voices 
heard (Murphy, 1990; Urban, 1982).  At this point in the stage of professionalism, 
teaching faced a crossroad.  Teachers, who had not been pressured by hiring 
practices and compensation, tried to voice their concerns using the current 
associations such as the NEA.  Through discrimination, their demoralizing status in 
the NEA forced them to take stronger action.  Teachers in mostly urban areas began 
to affiliate with the local unions in order to voice their concerns and gain political 
power to create change (Blum, 1969; Haley, 1904).  The NEA continued to focus on 
the membership of its administrators and largely ignored the educators, which 
helped fuel teachers’ motivation to seek out other means of voicing their 
disapproval, eventually giving rise to its present competitor, the AFT.  
If teaching is not a “classical profession” as the previous research suggests, 
then can it follow the principles of unionism?  The following reviews the research on 
the theory of labor unions, the model that the AFT and more recently, the NEA has 
endorsed.  It will be argued that even though the strategies of these two 
organizations appear to behave like unions, teaching appears to be bridging the 
divide between white and blue collar professions. 
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 There are three main principles of labor union theory.  The first is that the 
interests of labor and management are at odds.  There are limited resources and one 
person's loss is another person’s gain with a firm.  Second, standardized practices 
are more desirable under the theory of labor unions since uniform operations across 
all sectors of work make for a better and more efficient management.  Third, 
similarly skilled laborers are interchangeable and should be treated alike (Freeman 
& Medoff, 1979).  Applying these principles to education creates a clear division 
between the role of teacher and administrator, with rampant discrimination 
occurring since the creation of the position of principal (Tyack, 1974).  After 50 years 
of the NEA’s existence, teachers felt powerless and yearned for change.  If teachers 
could become unionized, then their collective voices would be difficult to ignore, 
much like the successes found in the private sector unions.   
As demonstrated in the New York City teachers’ strike in 1960, the strategies 
of blue collar unionism initially showed great benefits to its members, something not 
achieved through the NEA approach up to that time.  Prior to the 1960s, the NEA 
refused to be called a union, did not allow its members to strike, and prohibited its 
members to collective bargain with local districts.  With the NEA losing the right to 
solely bargain for teachers in (mostly urban) districts,  they began to shed their 
white collar professionalism for more aggressive labor-like strategies, or as the 
longtime NEA executive director, Don Cameron, stated, the NEA changed “from a 
tea and crumpets organization” into a union (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2006).   
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Two questions so far have been raised: can teachers be considered a “classical 
profession” and does the labor union model suitable for teaching?  As discussed, 
teaching has a difficult time being considered a classical profession, based on the 
issues previously reviewed.  In fact, it may benefit teaching to remain inclusive and 
inviting and to reflect the broader relationship between schools and the community.  
Turning attention to unions, teaching does not appear to fit the three labor principles 
outlined above.  Although teachers have been at odds with administrators, the 
“limited resource” cannot exclude students.  Teachers generally understand that 
substantial raises mean less money for school operations, curriculum, and student 
resources.  The parent group of the AFT, the AFL-CIO, recognized also recognized 
this.  As most of the group’s members in the private sector unions were losing 
membership, the public sector union was quickly gaining ground, forcing union 
officials to rethink the labor model (Selden, 1985; Urban, 1982).   Even as late as 1959, 
the AFL-CIO president, George Meaney, was incorrect in assuming that unions in 
the public sector would not be successful because “it is impossible to bargain 
collectively with the government” (M. Green, 1996).  With membership rates 
surpassing most private sector industries, Meaney and labor leaders balanced the 
power of teacher organization but understood the need to adopt the model to public 
sector. 
 Following the massive decade of unionizing, an interesting shift occurred 
with the teacher union approach.  The AFT, which originated from traditional blue 
collar unions, understood the potential benefit of unionizing white collar professions 
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(Braun, 1972; Selden, 1985).    Thousands of teachers were eagerly joining the union, 
surpassing membership percentages unlike most private sector unions.  The need 
for organization existed at all levels of government, from local to federal.  
Unionizing became less of an outlet for some urban districts and more of a 
mainstream component of the teaching profession in all districts.  A core 
communication of unions, collective bargaining, came under question as to its 
intents for depicting teachers as either blue or white collar professionals. 
Collective bargaining research receives mixed reviews concerning the 
advantages of promoting a professional identify.  Several researchers have 
discovered benefits collective bargaining has brought to teaching, such as reduced 
class sizes (Eberts & Stone, 1985), reduction and protection against “extra assigned 
duties” (Eberts & Stone, 1987), and even refined student discipline policies 
(Hechinger, 1967).  Yet despite these benefits, the combativeness approach typified 
in union bargaining scrutinized the collective bargaining process.  Calls for “reform 
bargaining” and “collaborative bargaining” were attempts to transform traditional 
union negotiating into constructive communication (Johnson & Kardos, 2000; 
Kerchner & Koppich, 1993) 
An effort that encapsulated the principles of white collar professionalism was 
the formation of the National Boards Certification program.  With two of its key 
sponsors, the NEA and AFT, the reform was an impressive first step towards large 
scale efforts by the union to improve the professionalism of teaching.  Shen (1999) 
states that teachers will only be able to improve their professional identify through 
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either improvement of teacher education and certification, or increase salary.    It 
was the most recent large scale effort to professionalize teaching, creating higher 
standards to differentiate instructional practices.  As Johnson (2001) points out, 
National Certification must balance the principles of unionism with leaving room 
for self regulation like that of white collar professions.  Other efforts such as peer 
review and career ladders attempted to “un-flatten” the teaching career but largely 
failed due to the divide it created among teachers (Nelson, 1996).  As stated before, a 
principle of unionization theory is that similarly skilled laborers are interchangeable 
and should be treated alike.  Nelson points out that peer review has created levels of 
teachers where some teachers act as managers, placing the union in a precarious 
position, attempting to resolve conflicts among its own members.  In one case, the 
managing teachers (promoted to these positions based on their position on the 
career ladder) were forced to leave the union as their responsibilities were 
considered managerial, even though their title was still “teacher.”  
This ongoing discussion of blue versus white collar approaches to unionize 
serve two overarching purposes for this study.  First, it is clear that blue collar 
unionism dominated the strategies of the both the NEA and the AFT in the 1960s 
and partly in the 1970s.  As the research later indicates, there are moderate gains in 
teacher pay also during this period.  But as discussed, the blue collar approach 
cannot be considered a long term application towards teacher professionalism.  
Thus, in order to understand union effects, one must analyze gains at different time 
periods in order to assess whether the style of bargaining continues to reap the 
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apparent raises witnessed in the 1960s.  Second, the contrast between blue and white 
collar union approaches becomes blurred following the period of the 1980s, meaning 
the NEA openly adopted traditional labor union approaches while the AFT 
understood the need to employ more professional strategies like reform bargaining 
and conciliatory negotiations.  Although this study will look at union effect as a 
whole, it cannot distinguish between the two methods, thereby limiting its analysis 
as to what method was more impactful.  Although states that do not have collective 
bargaining tend to utilize the NEA’s traditional method of bargaining (through 
lobbying, collective voice, policy influence),  it cannot be implied that states with 
collective bargaining laws are considered “blue” while non-collective bargaining 
states are considered “white.”   
 
Gender Debate: Women as Professionals 
 Although reviewed in a separate context, the gender debate has a common 
thread through most analyses of educational policy.  Females make up a substantial 
majority of the profession, accounting almost 80 percent of all teachers; yet there is a 
troubling disconnect between this majority and the attention of researchers on 
gender (Marshall & Andre-Bechely, in print).  The topic of gender and power is 
usually addressed in historical references, citing discrimination of laborer and 
manager, or issues of pay.  Yet, the research has been slow to implement issues of 
gender and leadership power into current scholarly work.  Gibby-Wachter (2000) 
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claims that leading scholars of union history often ignore issues of gender all 
together, thus leaving a gap in any analysis of union theory.   
 The reason teachers joined unions is perhaps the most written and discussed 
topic of gender in education.  Scholars repeatedly point out the rampant 
discrimination in pay, position, and respect between gender and race since the 
beginning of the one-room schoolhouse model.  Teaching has been considered 
“inherently a politically and bureaucratically subordinate occupation” (Bascia, 1998, 
p. 551).  As schools consolidated in the early 1900s, the only outlet available was the 
NEA, but because it was controlled by male administrators, women like Margaret 
Haley and Catherine Groggin turned to the local labor unions, ironically, also a 
mostly male institution at the time (Murphy, 1990).  Teachers had few other options 
because their own professional organization was essentially shutting the door on 
their issues.  Larson (1977) reasoned that this alliance with unions narrowed the 
types of issues that teachers could address. The push for the single salary schedule 
in the 1930s came largely the “equal pay for equal work” approach, and 
administrators quickly endorsed the plan not just as a way to curb inequity but also 
to ease administration of the new pay system (Podgursky, 2004).  Gibby-Wachter 
states that even after the adoption of the pay system, women were discriminated 
from taking on higher pay positions such as administrators or high school teachers.   
 The alliance with unions was not simply about women striving for equal pay 
and better work conditions, a long-held assumption for female involvement.  In 
some districts, female teachers were prohibited from marrying or having children, as 
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late as the middle of the twentieth century (Murphy, 1990; Tyack, 1974).  Women 
were discouraged from balancing families and work because men were given more 
prominent status (and higher paying jobs) under the assumption that they were 
providing for a family (Bascia, 1998; Shen & Hsieh, 1999).  Although equality was an 
issue, many women were trying to support their families, sometimes violating 
contract language that prohibited otherwise.  Even still, Bascia (1994) found a 
correlation between teacher union support and the lack of educational reforms and 
educational support for students.  What has been disproved, despite common 
assumption, was unions entered the teaching profession largely in part due to an 
influx of male teachers in the 1950s and 1960s.  Although male teachers were much a 
part of the union movement for similar reasons as women, the foundation for 
women unionizing occurred well before the 1950s and, as pointed out, had several 
reasons for motivation (Bascia, 1998; Cole, 1969; Murphy, 1990).  Some women 
teachers have rejected the combativeness and negotiation style of labor unions, and 
instead, opting for more diplomatic methods for dealing with conflicts (Bascia, 
1998).   
 These multiple reasons forcing women to unionize are often ignored in union 
research, prompting Marshall and Andre-Bechely (in press) and Bascia (1994) to call 
for a revisiting of union research.  This can help deepen our understanding of 
educational policy, in particular, for what we know about unions.  For example, the 
inability for the NEA and AFT to merge is often connected to the two approaches to 
professionalizing, the blue versus white debate (Prandy, Stewart, & Blackburn, 1983; 
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Wesley, 1957).  It is incorrect to assume that teachers who unionize also endorse the 
ideology of that organization, similar to the dilemma within a two party political 
system, where a voter may not agree with all the views of the party, but votes for the 
best choice.  Often, no other outlet exists to voice disapproval of policies and unions 
are limited in the number of bargained issues or negotiated terms, inviting criticism 
that unions narrowly focus on salary and benefit issues (Brimelow, 2003; Lieberman, 
1997; Rabban, 1991).  Hargreaves (1994) states that union activity, which require 
some members to become politically active, often draw criticisms of colleagues and 
peers who see such work as taking away from their classroom duties.  In her 
interviews with teachers, Bascia (1994) found many women teachers opposed to 
unionism due to its focus on bargaining over wages and salaries and issues that did 
not attract them to the profession.  This was also found in a similar research study 
conducted by Gibby-Wachter (2000) who found that some women rejected the 
tactics of unionizing as a way to increase professionalism, for they saw this as a 
threat to the feminine model that they used as a basis for their careers” (p. 7). 
Women were forced to choose between two patriarchic systems of organization, the 
NEA or the AFT, in order to voice their concerns or push for change.   
 Because women have had to revert to patriarchic forms of action, this has 
created a confusing and often critical status of teachers.  The literature critical of 
unions have labeled them as anvils for educational reform, slowing the process 
because of a narrowed focus on only teachers’ concerns and issues (Lieberman, 
1997), ignored the policies of younger teachers and instead defended incompetent 
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tenured teachers (Haar et al., 1994), and are primarily rentseeking by raising school 
budgets but lowering student achievement through the decrease of productivity 
(Hoxby, 1996).  Yet these criticisms can be constructs of a predominantly male media 
corps, male administrations, and sometimes male-led teacher unions.  As Gabby-
Wachter reviews in the case study of the famous 1960s Utah strike, the female 
president to the Utah Education Association as merely a “figurehead” while the lead 
negotiator with the school system and the press contact was a male who was linked 
to creating a militant union public image.  The direction was “inherently masculine” 
and the failure to see any results from the strike “directly related to the socially 
constructed feminized ideal for teachers and the low value of feminized work” (p. 
5).  There was an assumption that had developed that teachers were nurturing, 
moral role models, and compliant.  Because of the nature of the work, there was an 
expectation for serving and teaching children, rather than picket for better wages.  
Any action that questioned this image was immediately criticized in the press and 
other outlets of public relations.  The result was a public not ready to receive images 
of teachers striking or picketing, regardless if the work conditions were unfair 
(Kahlenberg, 2006; Kerchner & Koppich, 1993; Murphy, 1990).   
The public image of teacher unions still is highly criticized by some national 
leaders, such as the then-Secretary of Education Rod Paige likening teacher unions 
to terrorist organizations (Goldstein, 2004).  Bob Dole also stated openly at the 
Republican National Convention: “If education were a war, you would be losing it.  
If it were a business, you would be driving it into bankruptcy.  If it were a patient, it 
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would be dying” (PBS Foundation, 1996).  Teacher unions have traditionally 
donated less than three percent to the national Republican party (and 97 percent to 
the Democratic Party), drawing criticisms that the donation ratio does not reflect the 
political affiliation of its members (Lieberman, 1997). 
 Most scholars admit that in terms of public relations, teacher unions have lost 
out to the expected ideal of the feminized teacher.  Unions have made inroads for 
women as policy entrepreneurs, but the traditional expectations of the moral teacher 
seem to predominate.  When dealing with unions, especially at politically tense 
times, strikes and/or labor contract renegotiations, this is a common tactic to 
criticize the teachers’ motivations as “selfish” at the expense of focusing on 
“educational issues.”  The negotiated terms are usually limited in scope, thus 
leaving unions to bargain job responsibilities or narrow the focus of the teacher’s 
duties, again fueling the gendered assumptions of a teacher’s “abilities or interests” 
(Acker, 1992; Bascia, 1994).   For example, a bargained contract that limits the 
workday of a teacher to specific times before and after school may be an effort to 
protect teachers from being taken advantage of with extra duties.  On the other 
hand, it is possible to interpret these terms as a statement of personal desire to spend 
time with children, claiming that they chose to continue working after the bargained 
times of work are over for a workday.  Although this implication exists in most 
other unionized careers, the service ethic and the unfair gender expectations placed 
on teachers, appears to be augmented in the education profession. 
 31
 It is important to consider gender issues when undertaking any study of 
teacher unions.  As previously stated, such a consideration should go beyond just 
historical trivialization and instead, use a lens that reveals the hidden values placed 
on teachers or the often lost agendas from female teachers who do not have a place 
to voice these concerns either inside or outside the union.  Teacher unions are 
typically the most powerful lobbyist in education politics (Hannaway & Rotherham, 
2006).  Although most active teachers are members of teacher unions, most active 
teachers are not necessarily active union members.  The union agenda cannot be 
considered an agenda for women’s suffrage and it should not be the value system by 
which the female teacher is measured.  Likewise, the feminist lens also states that the 
minority number of male teachers, whose role and agenda are often lost in similar 
analyses, cannot be assumed to be the voice of the union, which operates politically 
and under a patriarchic framework.  In essence, any analyses undertaken by the 
union should be just that: the union agenda, and not blanketed on the teaching 
profession or worse, the “female or male” agenda.  As these scholars point out, 
teacher unions represent millions of school teachers but the unions are run by only a 
few teachers.  Despite female teachers reverting to unions as their only source of 
organized voice in the 1900s and well into today, it can be assumed that the alliance 
is only temporary, that is, until the foundation for education control becomes better 
balanced and not cursory towards teacher inputs. 
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Legal: Debate over Scope 
The state passage of collective bargaining laws provides the pedestal for 
teacher unionization.  At the root of the laws is the scope, or parameters for 
bargaining, which is usually defined as wages, benefits, and other conditions 
relating to employment.  An ongoing debate in union research has been the 
effectiveness of collective bargaining on public sector work, especially public service 
work such as education  Even as late as 1959, the year Wisconsin became the first 
state to allow public employees to unionize, the AFL-CIO president stated that, “It is 
impossible to bargain collectively with government” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 
2006, p. 9).  Because the scope is supposed to outline what can be bargained, much 
of the research has reviewed the effects of the scope as it plays out with union-
district relations or other consequences on school performance.  A general consensus 
exists in the literature calling for states to revisit the collective bargaining laws from 
a legal perspective.  States have not generally expanded the scope of bargaining 
since the original passage of the laws leaving districts and schools to bargain under 
laws that were written in the segregated environment of the 1960s, resulting in 
endless revisions to what teacher contracts’ boundaries push what can be bargained. 
Both critics (Moe, 2005) and advocates (Urbanski, 1998) of teacher unions have 
called for a revisiting of the laws, as one principal commented on the thickness of 
the teacher contract, “The thickness, the scope, of this phone book contract of a 
contract is, in my view, an indictment of how administrators ran their schools in the 
past” (Johnson & Kardos, 2000).  The following will review the two general 
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categories of research that has studied the legal implications of collective bargaining: 
limit or expand the current scope versus reforming the collective bargaining process. 
Research advocating for the expansion of scope argues that both the teaching 
profession and the students will benefit.  Teachers are not laborers, they argue, and 
the current scope forces unions to focus their efforts on labor issues such as wages 
and benefits.  By expanding the scope, unions can bargain for issues such as 
curriculum decisions, assessments, and standards for hiring, which can greatly 
benefit the workplace for teachers and students (Koppich, 2006).  The ability for 
teachers to organize helped prove that they can effectively bring about change and 
organize as a profession.   This collective power can champion ideas such as the 
collaboration of developing student assessments or curriculum. These issues exist at 
the classroom level, and allow bargainers to exercise their power beyond labor 
issues.  The current scope, despite its limitations, has brought teachers further into 
the decision making arena, positioning them closer to the decision making process.  
Still, they are held at bay for making decisions, and instead, considered part of the 
advising process (Eberts & Stone, 1984; McDonnell & Pascal, 1979).  Expanding the 
scope gives them decision-making power, something that has been missing for 
teachers. 
Another argument states that expanding the parameters will better reflect 
what already exists in many districts (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2006).  Issues such 
as class size, extra duties, and work schedules may not fall under the state scope, but 
districts have still bargained these issues with success.  These districts have been 
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proven examples where government and worker can bargain outside the typical 
labor issues.  Expanding the scope may allow these isolated successes to encourage 
other districts to expand beyond the scope (Kerchner, 1978). 
A third argument exists that changing the scope is required in order to stay 
abreast with the changing dynamics of the school organization (Kleingartner, 1973).     
When states set up their legal provisions for bargaining in the 1960s, the current 
events and the relationships were remarkably different than what exists today.  The 
“technology of teaching” has also changed, becoming less isolating and resistant to 
the patriarchic forms of administrations that existed in the 1960s.  Team teaching, 
peer review, and other collaborative forms of instruction could blossom if protected 
under collective bargaining agreements.  Currently, many of these reforms fail 
because unions are wary of management, with unions trying to establish differences 
in responsibility between teacher and administrator (Urbanski, 1998).   
Conversely, an argument exists for limiting the scope, not expanding it, in 
order to control the growing power teacher unions.  The impressive power teacher 
unions exert on all levels of government has been highly criticized due to the 
narrowed focus of the efforts.  Even though teacher unions defend their focus based 
on a narrowed scope, critics point to several instances where unions go beyond the 
legal limitations, but only in instances where it benefits the teachers’ self interests, 
and rarely for the betterment of student interest or broader educational reform 
(Brimelow, 2003; Hess & West, 2006; Moe, 2005).  Teacher unions have extended 
beyond their scope of bargaining to lobby all levels of government, support political 
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candidates, and act as a powerful state level education stakeholder, but these efforts 
appear to benefit teacher interest and issues, with issues like pay increases or 
electing supportive school board candidates.  Thus, expanding the scope may 
expand teacher union powers over more – not less – teacher issues.  As one of the 
primary tenants of labor union theory states: there exist limited resources with 
management and laborers at odds.  Unions serve to defend the laborer, securing as 
many resources as possible.   
Few critics of scope expansion would doubt that teachers require a voice, 
especially in a gendered-imbalanced institution such as schools; however, unions 
can sometimes create a hostile environment not just within the school, but also 
within the community (Freeman & Medoff, 1979; M. Green, 1996).  Unions set up an 
adversarial relationship, pitting teachers against administrators and teachers against 
school boards.  Based on the slow progress of school reform, some believe that the 
legal scope of bargaining should limit teachers’ capacity in union power, specifically 
outlining what can and cannot be bargained.  This will help “rein in” teacher union 
power and area of focus.   
Limiting scope is not always synonymous with “union busting” or other 
terms that hint towards breaking up teacher unions, as has been done in the private 
sector.  In fact, limiting the scope can have positive effects (Kerchner, 1978).   
Because collective bargaining brings an adversarial tone to the table, limiting the 
scope may also limit the areas where combativeness can occur.  For example, if a 
state’s scope of bargaining does not specifically include curriculum decisions, 
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teacher unions would likely use contract negotiations or other traditional means of 
labor negotiation to bargain curriculum decisions.  Thus, the issue of curriculum 
gets tangled with issue of wages, benefits, and other labor-like issues.  By separating 
curriculum from the collective bargaining process, it removes this discussion from 
the sometimes hostile process of contract renewals (Kerchner, 1978; Loveless, 2000).   
In the 1990s, there was a rise in popularity for reforming the bargaining 
process, rejecting the legal expansion or limitation of scope.  Scholars such as 
Johnson, Kerchner, Koppich, and Urbanski proposed setting up a “collaborative 
bargaining” between the district and union, essentially, reforming the combative 
process of contract renewal and issue debates.  Johnson (1987) stated, “Collective 
bargaining as a bartering process is for adversaries; collective bargaining as a 
problem solving process requires trust and good intentions” (p. 276).   These 
redefined relationships will promote better teacher involvement and grant them 
more decision making skills, at the same time create a better representation for 
education stakeholders.  Kerchner (1978; 1986) argues that two groups need to be 
included in the collective bargaining process.  Principals, whose voices were 
essentially lost in the rise of unionization, need to have a legitimate seat at the table, 
instead of being cast aside or marginalized and allowed to become critical of teacher 
unions.  Parents need to also have a legitimate role in the bargaining process, not 
being forced to choose between polarizing issues involving unions and school 
boards Industrial bargaining, as currently utilized in education, does not match the 
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current needed relationships between schools, community, administrators, and 
teachers.   
For this research, the legal debate is of primary focus.  The measured variable, 
collective bargaining, is measured based on how limiting or expansive a state has set 
their scope of bargaining.  It is not simply an issue of whether or not states have 
passed such laws, but to what degree does the scope relate to the impact over teacher 
wages.  No state has passed laws to reform the process, coined by phrases such as 
“trust agreements” or collaborative bargaining,” so although the idea has been 
presented, no state has ventured beyond the industrial scope set up in the 1960s.  
Yet, it should be noted that several districts already engage in such relationships, 
such as the unions that make up the national organization, the Teacher Union 
Reform Network (TURN).  A growing amount of evidence suggests that such 
relationships are more dependent on the individual relationships between a select 
few, such as the union leader and superintendent, and less, mandated by the scope 
or the legal parameters for bargaining.  So although such unions exist, it is difficult 
to identify the percent of those unions (or relationships) that exist within a state. 
 
FACTORS AFFECTING TEACHER SALARY DIFFERENCES 
 Given the broad literature that covers various debates on the professional, 
demographic, and legal repercussions of teacher unions, a surprisingly scant 
amount of research exists that explores the outcomes of collective bargaining.   
Several reasons have been attributed to this sufficient lack of knowledge.  First and 
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most noticeable, is the politicized nature of unions, causing most research, either 
publishing positive or negative effects, to be quickly dismissed in ongoing political 
battles.  Second, it can be difficult to measure union activity based on the study of 
contracts, the end result of collective bargaining.  Contract language can be 
voluminous and cumbersome, sometimes being loosely interpreting and 
implemented, and other times being used a formula for how teachers should work 
within a district or school.  As Hannaway (2006) states, “collective bargaining is a 
process rather than a predetermined set of outcomes” (p. 112).  Comparing contracts 
across districts can be dependent on how they are interpreted and implemented, 
leaving researchers to try to measure the union activity through a variety of means 
or simply categorizes it as union or not union.   
Finally, the effects of collective bargaining do not occur in isolated instances.  
Public schools become both involved and influenced by the numerous tides of social 
change.  Federal legislation such as the No Child Left Behind or the ESEA Title I Act 
can alter how local and state governments fund education.  Similarly, social changes 
can influence how teachers are funded.  In the 1950s, over 80,000 experienced 
African American teachers were fired in the South following Brown versus Board, 
after all-black schools were closed and mostly inexperienced white teachers were 
hired in place (Toppo, 2004).   In the 1970s, women’s career opportunities expanded, 
thus allowing women who would traditionally enter the profession to seek 
opportunities elsewhere.  Even though the inclusion of several statistical variables 
can help account for some changes, it should not be expected that collective 
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bargaining or unionization would remain the sole influence on of educational 
change. 
The following reviews two areas of research that pertains to this study: 
teacher salaries and work benefits.  Researchers have explored the effects of 
unionizing on areas beyond what is included, most noticeably, student achievement 
or teacher quality; however, the focus of this research is wages and benefits, the two 
main aspects that are within the scope of bargaining.   
 
Collective Bargaining and Teacher Salaries 
Beginning in the 1970s, researchers focused on unionization’s impact on 
teacher salaries.  The objectiveness of reports have been called to question 
(Peltzman, 1996; Snyder, 1994), with some studies acting more as political 
ammunition, than adding to the field of knowledge.  Kasper’s (1970) study was the 
first such study that questioned the affect of unions on teacher wages.  By polling 
thousands of superintendents across the country, he found that unions had no 
significant impact on increasing teacher salaries, controlling for other variables such 
as income and urbanization.  This study admittedly contained several statistical 
problems and posed more questions than answers, however, his findings created a 
heated debate, rather than an ongoing dialogue.  Critics pointed to the limited focus 
of one school year, essentially ignoring pre and post data (Lipsky & Drotning, 1973).  
He was criticized for using superintendents’ responses as a measure of union 
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effectiveness, despite the often tumultuous relationship that exists between unions 
and administrators (Lipsky & Drotning, 1973; Mitchell, 1979).   
Following his findings, the bulk of union wage affect research has either 
found no effects of unionization on teacher salary (Balfour, 1974; Mitchell, 1979; 
Smith, 1972), slight increases in pay between three and six percent in union districts 
(Baugh & Stone, 1982; Frey, 1975; Hall & Carroll, 1973; Lipsky & Drotning, 1973), 
and larger increases around 15 to 30 percent that resemble raises found in the 
private labor sector (Baugh & Stone, 1982; Schmenner, 1973).  Following the union 
research boom in the 1970s, it is commonly agreed that unions have had a small but 
significant effect that is between 3 to 6 percent (Gustman & Segal, 1976; Lipsky, 1975; 
Loveless, 2000; Mitchell, 1979; Murphy, 1990; Nelson, 1996; Prandy et al., 1983; 
Rabban, 1991).  It is unlikely that pay raises greater than ten percent occurred due to 
collective bargaining and occurred due to the sharp increase in inflation in the 1970s.  
Conversely, the null effects found by Kasper and others are generally disregarded 
because of the positive effects in the private sector research.  Also, because unions 
are founded upon securing more resources for its members (Freeman & Medoff, 
1979), it is unlikely that union popularity would have boomed if teacher pay had not 
experienced significant, albeit, small increases.  
In the last ten years, researchers have begun to revisit teacher salary trends.  
Improved methodologies and statistical approaches have allowed a better composite 
of siphoning the effects of unions away from many other social influences.  Hoxby’s 
(1996) study was the first to employ such methods and remains one of the most 
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comprehensive looks.  By using data collected from the Censuses of Governments, 
Hoxby constructed a data set that included every school district in the United States 
for 1972, 1982, and 1992.  Demographic data, student achievement, teacher salary, 
and other statistics were included in an attempt to produce an unbiased estimate of 
union wage premium.  As with any quantitative research, several assumptions were 
made that have been later questioned, yet her research remains as a benchmark for 
any future research.  She substantiated the earlier findings that unions have 
increased teacher salaries around 5 percent, but also found several negative effects 
of unionization such as an increased student dropout rate, lower student 
achievement, and a decrease in teacher productivity.  No other studies have 
attempted to replicate the depth or methodology as the Hoxby study. 
There has also been a focus on beginning and veteran teacher pay studies, 
again finding mixed results due to unionization.  Hoxby and Leigh (Hoxby & Leigh, 
2003) found that collective bargaining reduced the variation in beginning teacher 
pay, thus as the authors conclude, accounts for almost three quarters of the decline 
in teacher aptitude over the last 30 years. In addition, another reason attributes an 
improvement of career opportunities for women.  Despite advanced methodology 
used for the study, the sample is limited by female teachers immediately entering 
the profession out of college, thus excluding lateral entry or women who may have 
delayed their entering of the profession.  On the other end of the pay scale, veteran 
teachers seem to benefit more from collective bargaining then beginning teachers.  
Unions tend to favor policies that protect seniority and favor transfer policies for 
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veteran teachers (Ballou & Podgursky, 2002; Moe, 2005).  Similarly, Lankford and 
Wycoff (1997) found that increases in teacher pay tends to favor more experienced 
teachers, with “novice teachers [receiving] far less than a proportionate share of the 
large salary increases” from the collective bargaining process (p. 381).  Again, the 
findings are less clear as to whether “backloading” pay can benefit the teaching 
profession.   On one hand, teaching beyond five years of experience has not been 
found to have a significant impact benefiting student achievement (Ballou & 
Podgursky, 2002), while others have found that higher teacher pay for veteran 
teachers helps promote professional status and in turn, has led to increases in 
educational spending (Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996; E. A. Hanushek, 1989). 
It is apparent that unions do have some influence for teacher salaries based 
on previous findings. They are included in this research.  However, union effects 
cannot be measured alone and must be balanced with the host of other influences 
and factors contributing to teacher pay.  Teacher pay, unlike private sector labor 
pay, is not determined based on production and profits.  Teacher unions are one 
group, albeit a powerful one, among which several stakeholders contribute to 
funding patterns in education.  Therefore, it is important to broaden the scope of 
factors to include other variables, as discussed below. 
 
Collective Bargaining and Work Conditions 
 The second stipulation that commonly falls under the scope of bargaining is 
work conditions.  The definition of work conditions varies with each contract 
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negotiation, and unions have repeatedly tried to expand the interpretation of “work 
conditions” to include anything from class size restrictions to restroom facility 
upkeep.  Length of work day, preparation time for lesson planning, and teachers 
transfer policies appear to be the most popular bargained items under what specifies 
‘work conditions.’ 
 In other areas of work conditions, unions again have been shown to have 
positive and significant benefits for its members.  Union polices affecting class size 
enrollment caps have been the most researched work condition provision, possible 
due to the ease of measurement coupled with the strain an over-populated class 
places on a teacher’s workload.  High teacher/student ratio has been a factor in 
teacher turnover, yet reducing such ratios can be very costly to districts, thus 
reducing the likelihood.  Most findings have shown a positive effect of unionization, 
protecting its members from overloaded classrooms.  Eberts and Stone (1985) found 
that student – teacher ratios were 12 percent lower in bargained districts than in 
non-bargained districts while other reports have found an increase in contracts 
including provisions to limit or reduce class size (McDonnell & Pascal, 1979).  In 
1970, 20 percent of the contracts they studied had included class-size provisions; five 
years later, 34 percent had included such provisions.  The enforcement of these 
provisions range, with some contracts requiring the hiring of a new teacher if the 
class size is exceeded, while other contracts may expect the district to work in “good 
faith” to lower the class size.  In other areas of work conditions, unions again have 
been shown to have positive and significant effects for its members.   
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Beyond class size, unionized teachers have been shown to have 4 percent 
more preparation time than nonunionized districts (Eberts & Stone, 1987; Hoxby, 
1996).   Tighter discipline polices have been introduced as well as more protection of 
“extra duties,” that tend to infringe on a teacher’s work day.  Outside the classroom, 
unions have also bargained for stricter protections over transfer polices as well as 
protecting the dismissal of teachers simply because they marry, get pregnant, or 
other discriminating reasons.   
 The growing influence and involvement of unions’ interests in teacher 
contracts has become alarming.  The bargained provisions, while seen as protecting 
the individual teacher, have been criticized as hampering the production of 
teaching, and ultimately hindering the student’s learning.  This criticism is 
dangerous to unions, both politically as well as fundamentally.  For example, the 
transfer policies in many unionized districts have often been criticized as reducing 
flexibility and fend off educational reforms (Kahlenberg, 2006).  These policies 
overwhelmingly protect veteran teachers, while novice teachers, despite having 
union membership, may be fired in order to reassign a veteran teacher, regardless of 
a teacher’s quality.  The reported cost of firing a teacher in New York in the 1990s 
was estimated at $200,000 (Toch, 1996).  Hoxby (1996) found that such policies have 
hampered educational production, with student achievement dropping over a 30 
year period.  In terms of the industrial model of bargaining in education, Johnson 
and Kardos state, “Often contracts, particularly those in large urban districts, 
defined teachers’ responsibilities narrowly and minimally, thus making teaching 
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more like labor and less like a profession” (p. 12).  Most research critical of union 
effects on teaching can be summarized by the protection it has on mediocrity while 
sacrificing innovation and reform.  In terms of this research, many of the 
discretionary work conditions were not studied because of data collection issues, 
such as extra duty protections or work times, however, other work conditions, such 
as student-teacher ratios and school resources were analyzed in connection with 
higher teacher pay. 
 
NEED TO IMPROVE METHODOLOGIES 
 The first step for researching teacher salaries is to better understand the 
factors effecting teacher salary pay, as stated previously.  The second important step 
is to better understand the ways in which these factors are studied against the pay 
averages.  The following reviews several needed improvements that should be 
undertaken in order to fully understand how these factors influence and effect 
teacher pay increases over time. 
 
Extending the Time Frame of Analysis  
It is also important for teacher wage studies to account for the slow pace 
regarding educational change.  Teacher wage research must respect the gradual 
evolution of education reform.  The process for decision making in schools is 
hampered by several special interest groups, creating several layers of political 
power and influence (Marshall & Gerstl-Pepin, 2005).  Schools are funded by a wide 
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spectrum of public taxes, inviting ownership from all tax payers.  Industries rely on 
the products (graduates) of public education to be well skilled and competitively 
trained for the demands of the market.  The number of stakeholders with interests in 
education can be expansive and involve multiple levels of influence, power, and 
bureaucracy (Marshall, 1984).   Understandably, in order for some reforms to be 
brought to fruition, they must be compromised at the lowest common denominator, 
offering multiple benefits for several groups or and the diversity of stakeholders.  
Too often, teacher wage studies focus on limited years of data to include in 
the study (Eberts & Stone, 1986; Hall & Carroll, 1973; Kasper, 1970; Thornton, 1971).  
This creates problems when understanding the effects of certain factors.  Lipsky and 
Drotning (1973) draw conclusions on union influences based on data collected from 
one school year, however, unions, like many educational reforms, may take years to 
realize their impact.  Frey’s study (1975) was the first teacher wage study to look at 
salaries’ trends beyond one year of data.  His six year analysis included five years 
prior to unionization and the following year teachers voted to join a union.  Any 
significant changes in policy, including teacher salary increases, may not have been 
accounted for in the limited time following the decision to unionize.  The limited 
union effect may have pushed wages higher than what was outlined in the study.  
Conversely, non-unionized districts may have "caught up" in pay differentials in 
order to stay competitive, through recruitment and retention thereby minimized the 
gains of unionization.   
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Other studies have attempted to take a more “longitudinal” approach but still 
are subject to similar criticism comprising only one year of study.   Baugh and Stone 
(1982) collected data from two years, 1974 and 1977, and draw conclusions from 
gains and differences within the three year period.  Again, this hardly can account 
for tumultuous economic trends or periods of recession that may take over a decade 
to impact education.  Hoxby’s (1995) study remains as the most comprehensive look 
at the various factors on teacher compensation, drawing data from 1970, 1980, and 
1990. The study has no results pertaining to the years prior to unionization or 
compensation reform in the 1940s.  In order to understand regional differences in 
pay, a study cannot be limited to even a speculative twenty year window. 
 Teacher salary research must not only extended time period of analysis but 
also include data pre-and post the pivotal teacher salary reform movements.  
Hoxby’s large-scale study attempts to compensate for this pace, analyzing data from 
1970 to 1990.  Despite this effort, current studies still do not include data prior to the 
period of unionization.  Little remains to be known about the comparisons between 
districts or states prior to this pivotal reform in public education.  Districts that 
eventually unionize are assumed to have a more politically active environment, so it 
is possible that attention to increasing wages existed prior to unionization.  Thus, 
teacher wages may have always been higher due to this heightened political activity, 
regardless of union auspices.  Although unionization may have helped increase the 
salary difference compared to a non-unionized district, this remains an assumption 
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without a more expansive time period of study pertaining to a period greater than 
twenty years. 
 
Need for Regional Adjustments 
Inherent in teacher wage research remains relegated to comparing various 
school districts or states in order to measure pay increases.  These comparisons are 
commonly used for policy decisions, justifying current pay levels for its teachers, or 
drawing indirect assumptions on the level of quality of instruction (Chambers, 1995; 
Georgiou, Villarreal, & Moore, 2005).  Economic theory stresses the need to adjust 
for regional cost differences before such comparisons are made.  The power of the 
dollar is not consistent in every district or region, just like it fluctuates in the 
international economy.  Thus, one must adjust for regional cost differences in 
teacher wage research.  There are several approaches to adjust prices, and no one 
method has been endorsed in education, however, this remains a critical step in 
modern teacher wage research (Chambers, 1995; Fowler & Monk, 2001; E. 
Hanushek, 1997; Nelson, 1991; Stoddard, 2005).   
 Regional adjustments are not just limited to the power of purchasing dollars.  
(Chambers, 1995).  Most school districts pay teachers on a single salary schedule that 
is determined by years of experience and education levels.  Some states require 
teachers to obtain graduate degrees in order to stay employed, thus boosting the 
education level and the overall average salaries of its teaching workforce.  For 
example, North Dakota ranks almost at the bottom for teachers with advanced 
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education credentials.  Almost 80 percent of its teachers only hold a bachelor's 
degree which would minimize its reported average teacher salary.  Connecticut on 
the other hand, reports that almost 80 percent of its teachers have some kind of post 
bachelor’s degree experience.  In order to make an accurate comparison between 
Connecticut and North Dakota, a regional adjustment must account for teacher 
experience (Chambers, 1995; McMahon, 1994).  The same argument is applied to 
adjusting for experience levels among the teachers.  
 Adjusting for regional differences improves the analyses of education cost 
outputs.  With an increased attention on accountability and a school’s spending, 
neglecting geographical or demographical variations can alter conclusions.  
Claiming a state pays its teachers above the national average or ranks high on per 
pupil expenditure may be ill-founded after regional adjustments are applied.  
Walden (1998) finds that almost two-thirds of teacher wage differences across states 
can be attributed to regional adjustments.  Barro (1993) also finds that adjusting for 
rural versus urban population can dramatically affect raw average comparisons on 
teacher pay.  Teachers in urban areas are usually paid higher based on greater 
revenue sources.  Comparing a state such as Iowa, which is largely rural, to a state 
with a high percentage of urban dwellers such as New York, is not viable.  Ideally, 
the rural teachers of New York must be compared to the rural teachers of Iowa, thus 
making a logical and consistent comparison.   
 In order to understand how this will affect my study, two methods are 
reviewed: cost of living (COL) and cost of education (CEI).  The COL approach was 
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developed from economic theory, as a method to adjust costs and salaries based on 
the prices of standard consumer needs, regardless of location.  The cost of education 
index evolved from this research, but sought to include several school specific 
factors. 
Cost of Living Approach.  Cost-of-living research was the forerunner for 
making regional adjustment and has spawned several variations since its emergence 
in the 1970s.  Higher cost-of-living yields higher wages and salaries for its workers 
(Fournier & Rasmussen, 1986).  If it is expensive to live in a location, companies and 
employing institutions will pay higher wages in order to attract workers to the area.  
McMahon and Melton (1978) published the first interstate cost-of-living index that 
normalized index values on 100 representing an average cost of living.  Areas that 
have a higher cost-of-living are assigned an index above a hundred and vice versa.  
This index (interpreted as a percentage) can be divided into the actual teacher salary 
cost and the result will estimate the adjusted pay controlling for regional variation.   
One method for making a COL adjustment is through the use of the 
Consumer Price Index based on the “market basket” prices for goods, services, and 
rent in a particular region.  By collecting the prices for thousands of typical items 
purchased regardless of geographical area, the total costs can be compared to 
illustrate differences in the cost of living (Taylor & Keller, 2003).  A second strategy 
for estimating geographical variations is using the “comparable wage” method.  It is 
assumed that all professions will demand better wages in high cost of living areas.  
Similarly, profession will also have to offer high wages in order to attract workers.  
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Thus, schools in an area of high cost of living will be pressured to offer higher-than-
average salaries in order to attract more qualified candidates.   
The cost-of-living approach has several advantages both in its methodology 
and reporting.  The factors creating the index, such as prices or rent, are clearly 
defined and recognized by the public, even though the statistical methodology is 
complex and confusing.  This has helped policy makers and the public to 
understand its significance, interpret its findings, and accept the adjustments 
(Fowler & Monk, 2001; Nelson, 1991; Taylor & Keller, 2003).    Also, the factors that 
calculate the index are clearly defined and measurable such as housing prices or 
consumer goods (Nelson, 1991).  These factors benefit the historical application of 
the cost-of-living adjustment allowing researchers to calculate adjusted prices, 
salaries, and costs for over 60 years.  There is little variation in how this data is 
collected across various states, minimizing the error usually involved in multi- 
regional data collection efforts.   
However, some education researchers resist applying the cost-of-living 
approach because of the several education-specific factors ignored through COL 
methodology.  Even though rent and consumer goods prices account for teacher 
wage differences, no connection can be made to the quality of instruction or student 
achievement (Taylor, Alexander, Gronberg, Jansen, & Keller, 2002).  Thus, two 
districts may pay their teachers equally after the cost-of-living adjustment; however, 
the quality of life may be remarkably different (Stoddard, 2005).  A common 
example involves comparing a high wealth suburban area compared to a district in a 
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large inner-city.  Based on rent and market good prices, these two districts may 
appear to pay teachers equally following cost of living adjustments, but the quality 
of life and available amenities in teaching in these two districts may be drastically 
different.  Stoddard (2005) also finds problems applying a cost of living adjustment 
to interpreting education data.  She finds that teacher salaries were negatively 
associated with student test scores after the cost of index was applied.  For the study, 
not only do the cost-of-living and rent adjustments fail to adjust for differences in 
teacher wages but “may actually exacerbate existing differences” (p. 333).   Also, she 
finds that inappropriately adjusting for cost-of-living differences may affect other 
factors such as unionization.   
Cost of Education Approach.  The development of the cost of education (CEI) 
approach stems directly from the criticism of applying consumer good prices and 
rent costs to adjust for educational expenditures.  Although the CEI has been 
recently developed in the last ten years, this method is the preferred for adjusting 
education expenditures (Barro, 1993; Chambers, 1995; Stoddard, 2005; Taylor et al., 
2002; Taylor, Chambers, & Robinson, 2004).  CEI accounts for various regional 
differences uniquely attributable to the field of education such as teacher work 
conditions, benefit packages, student-teacher ratios, and teacher experience or 
background (E. Hanushek, 1997).  The latter, years of teacher experience and 
education levels, are the principle determinations for how most public school 
teachers are paid since the mid 20th century (Podgursky, 2004).  Not adjusting for 
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membership longevity, tenure or graduate level experience leads to incorrect 
comparisons in teacher wage research (Gaines, 2001; Goldhaber, 1999).   
Work conditions, defined by protection clauses or school safety, are also a 
critical component of regional adjustments.  A cost of education index can adjust for 
various work conditions so that suburban areas of similar work conditions can be 
compared to other similar districts.  The cost of living approach groups districts by 
rent prices, which may compare two remarkably different school environments 
(Taylor et al., 2004). 
Despite its wide acceptance in the education community, the CEI approach 
has several criticisms based on its implementation.  Its inclusion of discretionary 
factors such as teacher satisfaction or general working conditions, raise questions 
about the reliability of measurement (Taylor et al., 2004) Some CEI approaches 
include discretionary factors such as marital status, military experience of citizens, 
and climate, prompting reasonable questions about their relevance to the financial 
aspects of education (E. Hanushek, 1997).  In terms of public acceptance, quantifying 
these variables in terms of an index can be statistically confusing.  Understandably, 
the CEI approach has not been commonly used outside the educational economic 
community.  Policymakers have been less likely gravitate or endorse CEI findings 
since it becomes difficult to translate the findings to the public (Chambers, 1995).  
Based on the two popular annual teacher salary surveys published by the American 
Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, only the AFT 
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includes an adjustment for regional differences using the cost-of-living approach 
(Nelson, 1991) 
The consistency of data collection is also a common criticism of the cost of 
education index.  Many of these additional CEI factors are not collected through the 
US Census or Bureau of Labor.  Other factors can be quite subjective and costly to 
measure on a consistent basis, such as teacher satisfaction.  Although the Schools 
and Staffing Survey administered by the National Center of Educational Statistics is 
highly regarded as the best efforts to collect education statistics at the individual, 
school, and district level, the survey is only administered every four to five years.  
Based on the four administered surveys of SASS data, CEI researchers are only 
beginning to understand how various discretionary factors are related to aspects of 
education.3  
Comparisons of Indices.  Several studies use multiple adjustment indices in 
order to show similarities in accounting for various factors or to compare the 
differences in CEI to cost of living (COL) indices.  Taylor and Alexander (2002) have 
provided the most comprehensive look at adjustment index comparisons for 
intrastate studies on Texas: 
• Basic Cost of Education Indices 
o Current Texas CEI (Monk & Walker, 1991) 
o Updated Texas CEI (Alexander et al., 2000) 
o Texas Teacher Cost Index (Alexander et al., 2000, 2002) 
o Geographic Cost of Index (Chambers, 1999) 
• CEI’s based on Student Achievement 
                                                 
3 Including in the methodology section is a more comprehensive list of variables that will be used to adjust for 
regional differences in this report 
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o A&A Cost Function Index (Alexander et al., 2000) 
o I&R Cost Function Index  (Imazeki & Reschovsky, 1999) 
• Cost of Living Index 
o Cost of Living Index – based on comparable wages (Alexander et al., 
2000) 
 
They found that the cost associated with paying teachers fluctuated 
dramatically on seven different indices used in various studies.   The most 
conservative adjustment estimated the higher cost of living districts were paying 18 
percent more than the lower cost of living districts, meaning, it costs 18 percent 
more to pay for similar services and teacher salaries than the typically rural districts.  
More generous estimates implied an inflation of up to ten times the cost for similar 
sources between the high-cost versus low-cost districts.  She also mentioned that the 
latter finding was highly sensitive to the index strategy and a more realistic 
variation would be around 69 percent.  Substantial variation was in some districts, 
with adjustment index ranging from 1.02 to 2.83 for one district.  To illustrate the 
variation in index computation, if the average teacher salary is $30,000, in this 
district, the figure would be adjusted (based on various factors) from $30,600 to as 
much as $84,900.  Although this was an extreme case, the variation in index 
adjustment casts a shadow of doubt on the various methods.  Taylor and Alexander 
attributed this difference primarily to the methodologies used to develop the index.  
The COL index also skewed adjustments based on the use of comparable wages, 
which are problematic when used for adjusting wages. 
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Taylor also cautioned the use of indices for two other reasons: rural regions 
and student outcomes.  Such adjustments are typically highly correlated, since they 
use similar factors to develop the index.  In terms of rural counties, Taylor found 
that the variation was more pronounced, drawing conclusions on the sensitivity of 
data and stability of estimates.  Even though this study focused on districts within 
one state, it requires closer scrutiny over the percentage of the population living in 
metropolitan areas versus rural areas.  Also, the use of student outcomes, defined by 
student test scores, was a poor factor for adjusting salaries, which was to be 
expected.  In fact, Taylor found an inverse correlation between cost estimates based 
on input prices and cost estimates based on educational outcomes.   
Best approach for current study.  Based on other studies that have compared 
indices across CEI and COL adjustments, I employ the only published historical 
adjustment index by Berry and colleagues (2000), which uses a cost of living 
approach.  The CEI indices do improve the applicability to the field of education, 
however, they are more dependent on discretionary data and they do not include 
the years for this study.  As exampled, most CEI indices are highly correlated with 
COL indices, since they include major factors such as land and consumer prices.  As 
outlined in later sections, I will also include data on teacher-level specifics, such as 
teacher age and education.  As of printing, this was the first attempt to apply 
historical data at the teacher level and combining this with a COL approach.   
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The adoption of the single salary schedule has been one of the most pivotal 
reforms to teacher compensation that influenced the professional status of educators 
(Cohen & Geske, 1990; Davis, 1943; Lankford & Wyckoff, 1997).  By recognizing 
training and experience as the sole identifiers for paying teachers, the single salary 
system helped to transform teaching into an egalitarian profession (Lortie, 1969) in 
which the role of the teacher became standardized regardless of race, gender, subject 
matter, or background.  Although the reform helped “fix” the previous system of 
unequal pay for equal work, the financial restructuring followed a larger pattern of 
organizational standardization of the public schooling system, sometimes referred to 
as the factory model of schooling (Tyack, 1974).  Yet, despite this similarity in 
operation and teacher roles, the “unequal pay for equal work” is still prevalent 
when comparing teacher salaries across districts or states.  While wealthier districts 
pay premium rates for their teachers and have waiting lists for applicants, poorer 
districts have relied on state enticements and bonuses to recruit qualified teachers to 
the area because of lower teacher pay.  Consequently, there are a host of influences 
leading to differences in teacher pay across various districts and states.   
Uncovering the reasons for these differences requires one to navigate through 
the countless number of interest groups and stakeholders involved in the complex 
arena of policy-making (Marshall & Gerstl-Pepin, 2005).  Three major factors have 
been identified in teacher wage research as influencing differences in teacher pay: 
labor, economic, and social forces. 
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Labor Forces 
Labor theory sets up why the interests of managers and workers are at odds 
as well as why unions focus mostly on wages.  Unions seek to increase wages and 
improve work conditions for its members.  Laborers, typically with less power than 
managers, use unionizing as a way to seek better wages, work conditions, and 
benefits.  Meanwhile, firm profits are a factor of revenue and shifts in demand, 
minus real wages and employment (Abowd & Lemieux, 1990).  Because firms’ 
purpose are to maximize profits by minimizing costs (including employment), there 
is an inherent push against raising employment costs unless this yields increased 
production, and subsequently, higher profits (Blanchflower & Machin, 1996; Oswald 
& London School of Economics and Political Science Centre for Labour, 1987).  Labor 
union principles rest upon the idea that the interests of labor and management are at 
odds due to limited resources and divergent interests, or profits versus wages 
(Nickell, 1999).  Unions maximize their efficiency of representation by assuming 
uniform operations across all sectors, such that one contract can cover a maximum 
number of employees.  Under these uniform operations, unions argue that similarly 
skilled laborers are interchangeable and should be treated alike (Kerchner, 1986; 
Loveless, 2000).   
However, applying the previous theories of the labor approach to the public 
sector can be somewhat problematic.  First, the roles of management and laborer are 
different, with little need for oversight or supervision.  The skill set of principals is to 
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oversee the operations of the schools, but they are not required to be the leaders or 
models of instructional pedagogy.  They rarely are in positions to train teachers on 
the job, leaving this role to assistant principals, leader teachers, or no one at all.  This 
sets up a different relationship between school leader and teacher, as opposed to the 
private sector manager and laborer.  Specifically, the management of a school is 
spread across multiple roles such that teachers are managers of practice, department 
chairs are managers of curriculum and efficiency, and curriculum coaches are 
managers of teachers and practice. Simply put, the aims of both administrators and 
teachers are more inline than separate, when compared to the private sector.   
Second, there exists limited resources for public education and limited 
opportunity for increased wages.  Schools, unlike firms, do not operate with 
unlimited profit potential.  Arguably the definition of school profit can be 
interpreted as efficient education of the child, rather than the revenue generated 
from operations (Gyurko & Tracy, 1991).  Schools are funded by public tax dollars 
which are subject to public and political support.  Based on the current structure of 
school payrolls, also supported by teacher unions, all teachers receive wage 
increases, regardless of race, gender, and quality of teaching.  Because teacher pay 
exhausts much of the education budget for local districts, teacher pay raises must be 
balanced against funds for teacher resources, student support funds, and other 
school operations that are inherently tied to teacher function.  In that sense, teacher 
pay increases are connected to the successful functioning of school operations, and 
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one may argue, are more in line with the “profit margin” (defined by student 
success) of a school. 
Because the model of labor unions does not neatly fit the public sector of 
education profession, several researchers have hypothesized why teachers would 
have adopted the model.  Hoxby (1996) states that one reason may be attributed to 
the teachers’ parallel objective (with parents) for student achievement, but that 
informational and market imperfections lead teachers to desire different school 
input levels. These differences in desires may be defined by the teachers' expertise 
about student needs or their ability to understand the external forces acting upon 
education, thus using teacher unions as a voice for these desires.  Bascia (1998) takes 
this idea a step further, stating that teachers were not allowed to voice their 
expertise, based on the systemic discrimination felt by a largely women teacher 
workforce and a largely male administrator workforce.  In this model, teachers and 
administrators did not have aligned goals (as stated previously), and were forced to 
take action.   
The previous models appear to be more social in explanation, but Hoxby also 
puts forth an economic incentive as well:  
[Teachers also] demand a union [because] they have a different objective 
function than parents or administrators, presumably one in which school 
policies that directly affect them, such as teacher salaries, receive greater 
weight than policies that only indirectly affect them by affecting student 
achievement. A rent-seeking teachers' union can militate for school inputs 
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that maximize the objectives of teachers, rather than those of parents or 
administrators. (p. 672) 
 
 Based on the adoption of the single salary schedule, the labor union model 
can benefit from advocating better resources for all workers through an aligned 
system of pay.  The school board and local government that bargain with unions, 
however, are not equal or standardized.  Some exert more control or power over the 
educational process while others succumb to the demands and will of the teacher 
unions.  A common belief is that politically weak governments lead to higher public 
expenditures due to a susceptibility of stronger interest advocated, such as teacher 
unions (Falch & Strøm, 2005).  Uniting the will and desire of a district or state’s 
teachers can provide for a powerful lobbying voice in front of politicians (Marshall 
& Gerstl-Pepin, 2005).  Therefore, labor has an impact on state expenditure, and 
specifically teacher compensation.   
Taken together, teachers unionized for social as well as economic benefits.  
Reasons that relate more to Hoxby’s second model, teacher unions as “rent seeking,” 
may provide a (not the) foundation for why teachers’ public status as union 
members has been difficult to win popular support.  Teachers, unlike workers, are 
public servants with a duty to serve the children of their schools.  The idea that 
teachers adopt a “rent seeking” behavior contradicts an assumption for why 
teachers teach.   
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Economic Factors 
Another factor affecting teacher pay differences is the economic funding 
structure for school operation.  Because schooling is a public service with most of its 
funding coming from taxes collected by local and state governments, the “ability to 
pay” (at the state level) is defined by the internal sources collected through the 
entities revenue-raising ability and the availability of external sources such as 
federal grants or business partnerships (Barro, 1993).  States with relatively high 
internal fiscal capacity are also likely to have relatively high percentage of pupils 
from well-educated, prosperous families and relatively high living costs, a factor 
positively associated with the supply price (Boix, 2001; Cohen & Geske, 1990).   
However, economic development does not automatically lead to a larger public 
sector.  These taxes are established through political mechanisms requiring 
politicians to match the preferences of the enfranchised (Boix, 2001; Eberts & Stone, 
1985).  Therefore, the state’s ability to pay must be tempered with the citizens’ 
willingness to pay for educational services in the context of their willingness to pay 
for other publicly funded programs.  Consequently, a study needs to include both 
inputs and outputs of state funding in order to understand economic impact. 
 The inverse assumption also holds true: poorer areas tend to negatively affect 
teacher salaries (Loeb & Page, 2000).  The less capable a district can pay (low levels 
of taxability), the fewer resources will be provided to schools.  Chambers (1996) 
found that rates of one standard deviation below the mean for unemployment (3.2 
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percent) resulted in higher teacher salaries by 1.1 percent (controlling for all other 
factors) while a standard deviation above the mean (8 percent) resulted in a 
statistically significant decrease in teacher salaries by almost 1 percent.  Li (2002) 
also found a positive correlation between unemployment and teacher salaries, but 
reasoned this anomaly with the study’s limited scope of study of one year.  Several 
districts located in inner cities, where residential wealth tends to be lower, also pay 
above average wages in order to recruit and retain teachers.   
Using a longitudinal framework may be useful to add clarity to the ambiguity 
over residential wealth and teacher pay.  Although schools are affected by market 
indicators, such as unemployment, the financial effect on schools is buffered by 
bureaucratic barriers and population trends.  For example, even though the 
economy may lead to a recession and higher unemployment rates, it is unlikely that 
school enrollment will be significantly affected.  Because school enrollment 
determines the number of teachers employed, teacher salaries are more likely to be 
affected by increases and decreases in school population trends (Barro, 1993).  
Admittedly, public schools are not immune to the market economy and have been 
disadvantaged in times of district recession (such as Portland public schools in 
2003), but at the macro level, teacher salaries tend to resist significant fluctuations 
based on the market economy (Antos & Rosen, 1975).  The relationship between 
teacher salary trends and market economy fluctuations can be understood over a 
significant time period of study and including several factors that may impact 
educational funding.   
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Social Factors 
The two main factors that determine pay scales are teacher experience 
(longevity) and educational experience (educational credits or degrees).  Once the 
single salary schedule was introduced in the 1920s, almost every district in the 
country adopted some form of this pay system.  Regardless of quality or need, 
teacher experience and education determined pay.  The system was set up such that 
regardless of gender, race, or grade, all teachers would be paid equally.  Some states 
require teachers to eventually achieve advanced education degrees and some states 
continue to reward teachers pay increases with every year of experience.  
Consequently, any study trying to understand meaningful influences or trends in 
teacher pay must take into account, first and foremost, teacher education and 
experience. 
This willingness to pay for education services is related to the state’s 
economic growth but also with its social desire and attitudes for such services, the 
second factor of influence.  Applying one interpretation of Wagner’s Law, as the 
state evolved industrially, the public expenditures rises along with the social 
progress of its citizens.  The types of public services offered, such as defense, police, 
welfare, and education, allow the development and social progress of its citizens 
(Peacock & Scott, 2000).  Understandably, these services do not simultaneously 
expand in direct relation to the growth of the overall economy; they do expand 
based on the demand for services from the public.  Therefore, the desire for 
education, measured by the public’s willingness to spend on education, will increase 
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in relation to the percentage of citizens who have benefited from the service of 
education (Boix, 2001).  A state that has a large well-educated population will more 
than likely exert greater financial effort to support education (Barro, 1993).   
Teacher salaries have also been found to be correlated with metropolitan 
areas (Chambers, 1995; Lankford et al., 1996).  If more residents live within a specific 
district or locality, more taxes are generated, increasing the district’s ability to spend 
more on education. Although higher salaries are common in larger districts typically 
found in and around metropolitan areas, it remains unclear whether these salaries 
are a result of unionization.  Larger urban districts generally tend to pay teachers 
higher than rural districts (Gaines, 2001; Lankford et al., 1996).  Although there is no 
single cause for this difference, factors may include unionization (which generally 
tend to happen in metropolitan areas), more financial resources, and a greater need 
to attract teachers to less than favorable working conditions.  
 In addition, several studies have tried to measure the impact of teacher 
gender and race on average teacher salaries.  Prior to the single salary schedule, 
females and nonwhite teachers were often discriminated against through lower pay 
despite equal work (Figlio, 1997; Haley, 1904; Podgursky, 2004).  After teacher 
compensation adopted the single salary schedule, it is less clear whether 
discrimination existed.  Some studies have found that female teachers are paid 
slightly less than male teachers (Walden & Newmark, 1995) and similar pay 
differences exist in racial comparisons (Cohen & Geske, 1990).  Under the single 
salary system, experience and education are the only determinants of standard pay 
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levels for a state or region.  Unfortunately, few studies can accurately connect 
education and experience to teacher pay based on gender and race (Chambers, 
1995).  Only the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) has collected national on data 
individual statistics for teachers, however, the survey is not administered 
consistently or often.   
 Finally, age considerations have been questioned as a factor impacting 
teacher salary differences.  The elderly population, a powerful voting demographic 
population, is indirectly less inclined to support increases in education spending 
(Preston, 1984; Ward, 1988).  Recent studies have shown that despite elderly 
populations being supportive of education spending, they are less likely to support 
tax increases (Miller, 1996).  Burbridge (2002) also found that the elderly population 
had a positive impact on spending for education but a negative impact on tax effort, 
which indirectly influences education spending.  These findings support the need to 
account for the percentage of the elderly population when considering influences on 
teacher pay.  
 
Theoretical Framework for Current Study 
As previously outlined, social, economic, and labor forces have all historically 
exerted direct and indirect influences on teacher salaries.  Taken together: a more 
educated population leads to more support for educational services and 
expenditures (social); public support for these services is balanced by the state’s 
inputs and outputs for education versus other public services (economic); and the 
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deliverers of these services, the teachers, feel valued and compensated for their 
service as professionals (labor).  Because these factors depend on the complexity of 
the political environment in which they reside, each of these factors have historically 
exerted a differential influence across the various states.  The resulting effect, in my 
opinion, is unequal pay for equal work.   
In order to understand how any one factor exerts its influence over time, it 
must be considered in light of the other influencing factors.  To the best of my 
knowledge, no study has attempted to understand or control for all these factors, 
while also controlling for teacher experience and educational attainment.  In 
addition, no study looked at these factors over time, accounting for long term trends 
in teacher pay.  With the focus on collective bargaining provisions, this theoretical 
framework will guide the analyses for the following questions of interest.  See 
Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the framework. 
 
QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
Question 1:  How do the collective bargaining laws affect teacher pay in the last 40 years, 
after controlling for the influences of social and economic forces? 
Using states as the level of analysis, I examined the impact of labor forces on 
the teaching salaries following the height of unionizing in the 1960s.  I hypothesize 
that union effects, controlling for all other variables, will have a small but significant 
effect on overall teacher pay, between one and 3 percent at the state level.  Collective 
bargaining helped organize the profession and redefined the relationship between 
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school boards and the teachers.  By employing the labor model of collective 
bargaining, teachers were able to capitalize on a vulnerable, unorganized level of 
school governance.  The pressure of a unified teaching corps created tension and 
confusion, but also helped bring about needed pay raises and improvements to 
work conditions.  Although a host of issues were brought to the attention of teacher 
unions, teacher unions were first judged against their ability to raise wages.  The 
success still found in teacher unions is evidence that there was some success in the 
public sector. 
These successes, however, have been minimal.  Although previous studies 
claim unions have raised salaries as much as 20 percent, I reason that these numbers 
are inflated due to two reasons.  First, most union wage research was conducted in 
the 1970s, following the period of the collective bargaining turmoil in the 1960s.  
During this time, the country’s inflation was steadily increasing, and thus, public 
sector salaries were also increasing.  Any study that does not account for inflation 
and other factors may be narrowed in its interpretation.  Also, most studies were 
conducted under limited time frames, with few if any studies accounting for data 
prior to the age of collective bargaining.  Thus, conclusions amount the differences 
due to collective bargaining may be ignoring prior increases due to other factors 
such as state wealth and regional differences in cost of living. 
 
Question 2:  How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on teacher pay, controlling 
for the influence of social and economic forces, differ over various eras in school reform?  
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The relationship and approach of teacher unions has changed over time.  The 
degrees of militancy, labor-like approaches, have seemed to subside, understanding 
that long term successes are attributed to productive relationships with school 
boards and community leaders.  Also, teacher unions have made significant strides 
in bringing attention to a largely female workforce who have been discriminated 
and managed unfairly by mostly male administrators.  The only stagnant piece of 
this relationship has been the focus of teacher union bargaining: teacher salaries.  It 
is still argued today that despite the many criticisms of teacher unions, “at least they 
bring about better pay.”  Using a data set that spans several ages of teacher 
professionalization, from the era of teacher unionizing to the era of accountability, I 
hypothesize that teacher unions have had a slowing, if not, null effect on teacher 
salary increases since their inception almost fifty tears prior.  States that are not 
unionized have recently made strides in order to overcome the pay gap.  Although 
teacher organizations (mostly the state level NEA association), has been a powerful 
force in nonunion states, this method of organization, not the local unionized model, 
has brought about significant increase in pay. 
 
 
 
Question 3:  How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on teacher pay, controlling 
for social and economic forces, differ by region of the country over the past 40 years? 
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 Teacher unions cannot and should not be assumed to act and behave 
similarly across all regions.  Much of the structure and culture of the teacher unions 
has been adopted by the cultural of unions within the locality or region of the 
country.  By studying regional differences and union impact, I hypothesize that 
regional differences will account for most of the variation in teacher pay differences, 
creating a non-significant effect of teacher unions on pay differences.  I reason that 
teacher salary differences have always existed, prior to collective bargaining.  This 
may be a function of the organization of schooling, such that teachers received better 
pay in places where the school system and its infrastructure are better organized.  It 
may also be due more to the wealth of the state and region, and its ability to pay 
teachers more.  Regardless, I hypothesize that regional differences existed prior to 
collective bargaining, and thus, unions have had little if any success in affecting this 
difference.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
  
STUDY DESIGN 
State Level Analysis 
The current study uses a state level, as opposed to a regional design, because 
there are several advantages to using states as the unit of analysis.  First, states are 
both “legally and fiscally, the center of gravity for elementary and secondary 
education” (James, 1991, p. 190).  Teacher pay is indirectly and directly regulated at 
the state level, either through supplemental state funding or through state pay scales 
with local bonuses.  Legally, states must respond to an increase in litigation aimed at 
resolving the inequity of school services among districts (Burbridge, 2002).  Second, 
states have increased their fiscal capacity from increased tax revenue, which has 
allowed states to supplement the costs of education services (Salmon, 1987).  
Although it is unclear whether the increase in revenue has directly benefited teacher 
salaries, and more than likely has helped pay for school improvements or federally 
mandated programs, increases in state aid may allow districts to increase teacher 
salaries (Bradbury, 1993).  Third, schools remain “locally controlled,” based on 
governance structures or their connection to the community, however, schooling has 
become much more of a global process.  Some states are trying to bring balance to 
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the funding of schools, which is usually tied to local wealth.  For example, states 
such as South Carolina have moved beyond the locally funded model by voting to 
eliminate all local property taxes and instead fund all schools through state revenues 
of sales taxes.   This change is in hopes that equal funding, regardless of residential 
wealth, will bring equal resources to all districts.   
In addition, a state level design may yield analytic benefits.  In terms of 
unionization, the spillover effect (union districts influencing nonunion neighboring 
districts to raise wages) is more likely to occur at the district level.  Accounting for 
the spillover effect can be a very challenging to account for quantitatively.  
Collective bargaining laws are mandated at the state level, and although there may 
be evidence of neighboring states influencing teacher wages, it is less likely to occur 
(Barro, 1993; Burbridge, 2002).  Also, states that have not passed collective 
bargaining laws tend to have powerful state level teacher associations, similar to 
district level unions based on their powerful lobbying efforts and impressive 
memberships; however, they are not defined as a “union” (C. Marshall, personal 
communication, 2005).  Consequently, a state level analysis may yield better insight 
into the gains in teacher pay through state teacher organization efforts, which may 
be ignored through a district level study. 
Although there are critics of a state level approach, I feel that this is the best 
approach for my questions of interest.  Critics of a state level approach argue that 
taking into account the number of stakeholders, interest groups, and factors 
affecting teacher salaries is sizably more difficult than the number needed at the 
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district level.  Thus, the higher the level, the more a study needs to account.  Frey 
(1975) frames a second reason for district level studies: improved data collection 
methods.  He argues that if a study centers around a region or district, the data 
collected will be less likely inconsistent, since it is collected with a controlled area. 
The current study addresses these criticisms in several ways.  First, I employ 
a historical approach, including data for 40 years, from 1950 to 2000, allowing for 
trends in teacher pay rather than snapshots of cross sectional analyses.  This creates 
a comprehensive data set that allows one to study trends at the state level.  Second, 
each variable in the current study was collected by the same agency or source, which 
addresses the previous concern over issues of inconsistency in data collection across 
states.  For example, most state revenue data has been collected by the US Statistical 
Abstracts using the same methodology and collection strategy across all states.  To 
this end, I ignore discretionary data such as teacher satisfaction surveys that may be 
constructed differently for different parts of the country.  Although this requires the 
reduction of certain variables, it allows for a more historical approach to 
understanding trends in teacher pay.   
 
 
Data Sources 
For the current study, teacher salary data was drawn from several 
governmental data sets such as the US Statistical Abstracts, US Bureau of Census, 
the National Education Association, and the National Bureau Economic Research.  
Because of the longitudinal design of the study, it was important that all included 
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variables were collected throughout the duration of the study.  All variables and 
their sources are presented in Table 2.  All economic indicators, such as state wealth 
and expenditures, were collected through the US Statistical Abstracts, an annual 
report that compiles many statistics from various federal departments and 
organizations (US Census Bureau, 2005).  The political data was supplied by the 
National Council of State Legislatures (T. Storey, email communication, February 15, 
2007).  Other social factors, such as teacher experience, teacher educational 
attainment, teacher race, were extracted from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS).  Using actual Census responses from the decennial surveys, I was 
able to create state-level data based on individual teacher respondents for each of 
the social factors.  Because each of these variables is generated from Census data, the 
collection was consistent across all states and all years.   
 
MEASURES 
Dependent Variable: Annual Teacher Salaries 
The most common method for analyzing teacher salaries is to use the NEA or 
AFT annual reports, which are collected, published, and written by both these 
teacher union organizations.  Although the NEA data has been collected for almost 
60 years (and is used as the primary report for government documents such as the 
US Statistical Abstracts), there has been recent criticism surrounding the method of 
collection as well as the inherent bias of teacher unions reporting on salary data 
(Florida Department of Education & McDougal, 2006).  Both organizations rely 
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solely on state department surveys.  These surveys ask state departments to report 
out various statistics, including average teacher salaries paid in the last year.  The 
survey method has been criticized for differences in the way states interpret and 
report on various items.  For example, in the AFT survey some states include 
support staff in the calculations, thus lowering the overall average.  Alternately, the 
NEA does not allow supplemental pay, such as bonus supplements, to be factored 
into average pay.  This increases their overall average for some states but not others.   
Even though the differences may seem insignificant, taken together, they decrease 
the precision with which my dependent variable would be assessed.  
  Consequently, I used the decennial US Census Data as a way to calculate the 
average teacher salary for each state with increased rigor and consistency.  As with 
all census data, the surveying remains consistent throughout the period of focus.  
Additionally, individual-level reporting allows for a better understanding of true 
wages, defined by a teacher’s extra duties such as coaching or bonus pay.  Through 
the use of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), a publicly available 
tool used to extract Census data, I was able to calculate the average state teacher 
salary for employed, non-private school teachers, from 1950 to 2000 (Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series, 2006).  Consequently, the average teacher salary is 
measured from the individual, consistent across all states and time, as opposed to 
the NEA data, which is inconsistently reported by states, and measured from the 
state department (and not individual).   
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Once the data was collected for each of the decade time points, I used the 
following method to interpolate the missing data between the “non Census years.” I 
used the rate of change for each year, taken from the NEA annual salary data, to 
calculate the rate of change for the Census data using the following formula: 
 
ݕ௧ାଵ ൌ ൬
ݕ௡ାଵ଴ െ ݕ௡
ݔ௡ାଵ଴ െ ݔ௡
൰ כ ሺݔ௧ାଵ െ ݔ௧ሻ ൅ ݕ௡ 
 
Where yt+1 represents the estimated Census salary based on the 1) rate of 
change between the Census decennial time points yn+10 – yn and the same time 
points for the NEA salary xn+10 – xn, 2) multiplied by the difference from NEA 
current (xt+1) and previous year (xt), and 3) added to the previous Census year 
represented by yn.  This formula produces a rate of change for each year and 
allowed for the interpolation of the teacher salary Census data between the 
decennial time points (G. Henry, personal communication, November 29, 2006).   
Finally, I adjusted all salary data for regional cost differences and inflation 
using a historical cost of living index (Berry et al., 2000).  The index provides a 
constant for every state and every year from 1960 to 2000.  By dividing the average 
teacher salary by the cost of living adjustment, I adjusted all salary data to be 
measured in the year 2000 dollars.  The benefit of using this method is to compare 
salaries adjusted at the same dollar value, measured in the dollar value.  For 
example, the actual average teacher salary in 1960 for Arizona was $5,404 and the 
average salary in 2000 was $35,983.  By adjusting for cost of living and inflation 
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(COL index for 1960 = 18.4), the adjusted salary for 1960 in 2000 dollars, is $30,630.  
Choosing not to adjust actual salary data for cost of living (and instead using the 
COL as an independent variable), would result in the dependent variable needing to 
be adjusted for inflation and cost of living, in order to make comparisons across 
states and over time.  Furthermore, the current study is less interested in the effects 
of cost of living and inflation as a controlled variable, and more interested in the 
effects of other variables such as state wealth, demographics, etc. 
 
Independent Variable: Collective Bargaining Laws 
In order to measure the degree to which states have passed laws favorable to 
collective bargaining, I used the 14-item data set from the National Bureau of Labor 
Relations Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law (NBER) (Valletta & Freeman, 
1988), which measures collective bargaining laws for all 50 states from 1955 to 1985.  
The NBER Collective Bargaining data set has been used in similar longitudinal 
studies of teacher unions such as Hoxby (1996), Farber (2006), and Freeman (1986).  
It documents the year (and month) for each state’s passing of the collective 
bargaining laws, allowing researchers to test various economic, social, or 
demographic shifts that may have occurred after the legal passing of unionization. 
I also acquired the update to the data set from 1986 to 1997 (K. Rueben, email 
communication, September 6, 2006).  Finally, I carried forward the data from 1997 to 
the remaining years in the study.  This method has been used in previous studies, 
mostly because collective bargaining laws have rarely changed since the 1990s.  
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Similarly, prior to 1959, public sector employees were not allowed to bargain, thus 
the laws were unchanged from 1950 to 1954 (Farber, 2006).  Appendix A provides a 
detailed description of the 14 labor provisions classified as well as the values 
assigned for each level of provision passed.  
In order to collapse all the collective bargaining variables, I created a 
Collective Bargaining Index (CBI) which weighted and summed the variables, 
centering them around 0 (no provisions), and ranging from -14 (actively prohibiting 
unions) to 63 (union friendly).  I weighted the first labor provision, “collective 
bargaining” to match the sum of all others, thus accounting for half the total score a 
state could receive.  This was done for two reasons.  First, all other variables, such as 
strike provisions and union agency dues provisions, hinge on the allowance of 
collective bargaining laws, thus without collective bargaining, none of the others 
would even be possible.  Equating the variable “collective bargaining” with all other 
provisions provides a balanced weighting between the allowance of bargaining and 
the additional provisions shat could either enhance or limit union activity.   
In terms of the current study, it is questionable as to the connection between 
collective bargaining (the primary independent variable of interest) and the 
influence of teacher unions.  The scope of allowed bargaining within a state does not 
always reflect the presence of unions within a state.  In some states, teacher unions 
have a powerful presence at the state level where teacher salaries are determined.  
Union activity is mostly occurring at the local level and more active in metropolitan 
areas as opposed to rural.  Thus, in a state with a generous scope of bargaining, but 
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lacking a strong labor presence usually found in metropolitan areas, union activity 
may not be as strong.  This refers to the conceptual difference in some literature 
between collective bargaining and unionization, two terms that are often used 
synonymously.  Collective bargaining is set at the state level, which may not 
necessarily reflect the popularity of unionization at the local level.   
 The gap between union and collective bargaining is most apparent in short term 
studies.  However, in the current study, a 40 year analysis allows for state legislation 
to invite local activity.  In more metropolitan areas (which is controlled for in the 
study), unionization occurred quickly, due to the labor groups that existed in the 
private sector (McDonnell & Pascal, 1979; Murphy, 1990).  Teacher unions were 
quick to organize, with some affiliates (mostly AFT), part of the local AFL-CIO.  
Rural areas may not have been as quick to unionize based on the lack of union 
activity or the spillover effect of the larger urban areas.  By extending the time frame 
of the study, I can allow for a significant window of “spillover” into the non-urban 
areas.  Also, by controlling for metropolitan areas, I can account for the likelihood of 
union activity usually centered in larger cities.  In addition, collective bargaining 
reflects state level which better maps onto state level unit of analysis of the current 
study.   
 
Control Variables: Social Factors 
Teacher demographics.  Several factors for teacher characteristics were collected 
from the US Census 
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• Experience 
• Educational attainment  
• Gender 
• Race 
• Place of work 
 
In terms of years teaching, I used the average reported age of the teachers, 
knowing that age does not perfectly equate to experience (lateral entry, mid-career 
transitions), but overall, there is a high correlation between age and experience.  In 
terms of education attainment, I constructed an education index that combines two 
Census variables, Highest Grade Completed and EDUC99, which combined, span 
the time period of study from 1950 to 2000.  A 4-point scale was used to classify each 
teacher’s education attainment, valued “1” (high school or below), “2” (some 
college), “3” (college degree), and “4” (beyond Bachelors).  A rating of 4 applied to 
teachers who completed work such as educational credits that could be considered 
credit for teacher pay increases.   
It was also important to understand where the teachers are employed within 
the state.  Chambers finds that districts located in more densely populated counties 
and those that are located near major urban centers pay higher salaries for teachers.  
Districts located within 75 miles from three central cities pay its teachers 2.2 percent 
higher than districts located within the same distance of only one city.  This could be 
due to the vigorous competition for teacher candidates, since teachers do not 
necessarily live in the districts they teach and are willing to seek better pay.  For the 
current study, I used the Census data to extract the regional variable, teachers 
working in a metropolitan area (percent). 
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I found that overall, 41.8% of all teachers working within a metropolitan area 
while 56.4 percent of the general population lived in a metropolitan area.  However, 
I used the prior statistic since teacher salaries are more influenced as to where they 
work rather than where they live. 
 Other teacher characteristics were included in the data collection, such as 
• Female teachers (percent) 
• Race of teachers (percent) 
 
The average percent of teachers who were female within a state and found that 
overall, 69.8 percent (SD = .057) of all teachers were female.  In terms of race, 
because the Census only collected the race of White, Black, and “Other” for my time 
period of study (specifically 1950 and 1960), I classified all future teachers into one of 
these three classifications.  Overall, 90.7 percent of all teachers are White (SD = .097) 
and 8.0 percent of all teachers were Black (SD = .099).  Other social factors included 
various population statistics, such as the racial background to the state population, 
the percent of the population over 65 years old, and the percent of the population 
living in a metropolitan area.   
 Educational Attainment – General Population.  The second category of social 
factors was educational attainment of the general population: 
• High school diploma earners (percent) 
• High school diploma earners by race (percent) 
• College degree earners (percent) 
• College degree earners by race (percent) 
• Population of 5 to 17 year old enrolled in school (percent) 
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These variables were collected at the decennial level and linearly interpolated 
in order to fill in the missing data, following a popular procedure for Census data. 
Political Party Control.  Finally, I constructed a political party control variable to 
reflect the degree to which states were controlled by one political party: 
• State Senate control (Democratic, Republican, or other) 
• State house control (Democratic, Republican, or other) 
• Governor’s office (Democratic, Republican, or other) 
 
If there was a unified controlling political party across all three branches of 
government, than the state was assigned either a -1 (Democratically unified), 0 (split 
control), or 1 (Republican control).  The index was centered at 0 in order to better 
interpret whether either political party had a positive or negative effect on teacher 
salary increases.  This variable was calculated annually for all states in the study. 
 
Control Variables: Economic Factors 
  State Wealth.  In order to measure state wealth, I collected several factors both 
on state revenue and expenditures for every state and every year in the study: 
• State revenue per capita (dollar) 
• State expenditures per capita (dollar) 
• State expenditures on education K-16 (Percent) 
• State expenditures on education K-12 per pupil (dollar) 
• Per capita income (dollar) 
 
At the time of data collection, it was unclear as to what variable would best 
measure state wealth, so several competing variables were chosen.  All variables 
used for the model have been used in previous studies to measure state wealth.  I 
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also calculated the percent of state expenditures on education in order to measure 
the state’s dedication for spending on education, reasoning that if the state used a 
larger percentage of its resources on education, there may be a tendency to pay 
better teacher wages.  Per pupil expenditure is a common statistic used to compare 
how much a district or state spends on education, with the assumption that this also 
measures how much a district or states supports education, because of its financial 
decision to spend versus how many students are enrolled.   
For this study, I chose not to use per pupil expenditure for a number of 
reasons.  First, the calculation of the variable includes the line item of teacher 
salaries, the dependent variable.  Instead, I chose to use a two-variable approach to 
assess the state input and state output.  For input, this would be defined as the 
revenue a state receives, through local and state taxes, and other resources.  This 
revenue is not specifically slated for education use, but rather, the general operating 
funds for states.  For output, I wanted to assess how much of this was being spent 
for education purposes, in relation to all other public services funded by the local 
and state governments.  In some states, education (and teacher salaries) is primary 
funded by local districts and supplemented with states funds, if at all.  Other states 
operate under a state centered approach, with local districts offering optional district 
bonuses.  In order to compare across both types of states, I assessed input and 
output for the combined local and state districts, but herein referring to them as 
“state revenue” and state education expenditure.   
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Finally, all economic variables were adjusted for cost of living and inflation, 
similar to the dependent variable.  This was done so that all economic measures 
were valued at the dollar value in the year 2000 and both the dependent and 
independent variables were valued on the same scale.  Descriptive statistics for all 
variables can be seen on Table 3.  In addition, bivariate correlations among all 
variables can be seen in Table 4. 
 
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
Time Series 
The organization of the longitudinal/cross sectional data of the current study 
requires the use of Time Series Cross Sectional analysis (TSCS) (Beck, 2001), a 
division of time series study in econometrics.  The use of this approach in 
quantitative studies is relatively new, despite the concept of understanding data 
over time and space has existed for decades (Adolph, Butler, & Wilson, 2005).  
Despite the complexity of the methodology, the statistical analysis has been aided 
through the development of computer software able to handle the intense 
quantitative load of these methods.   
 TSCS studies are characterized by their data structure over space and time.  
Similar to hierarchical or panel data, TSCS data is organized such that there are 
multiple levels both vertically and horizontally, much like studies that analyze 
students within a class within a school over time.  However, there are distinct 
differences that separate TSCS from quantitative methods such as Hierarchical 
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Linear Modeling or traditional panel-level analyses.  HLM or panel level data is 
usually collected over a limited time frame, perhaps a pre and post or even a few 
years of study.  If the panel, or units of subject, are referred to as N, and the time 
points as T, then these studies usually identify an N > T characteristic.  The 
asymptotic nature of the data set is focused on the subjects, usually respondents to a 
survey or, as in the case above, students within schools.  Thus, a sample of students 
is collected in order to make generalizations over a population of students not 
otherwise included in the model.  Consequently, the focus is on generalizing to a 
larger population.  Alternatively, in TSCS studies, the asymptotic focus is on T, 
while the subjects, such as states or countries, are the population, rather than the 
sample (Ramanathan, 1993).  Understandably, because the approach of traditional 
ordinary least squares uses assumes T < N, several adjustments must be made in 
order to proceed with a TSCS study. 
 The TSCS methodology can be used for data, such as that used in the current 
study that traditionally violates many of the Gauss-Markov assumptions of the 
often-used ordinary least squares (or its derivatives).  In OLS, residuals must be 
independent and identically distributed, however in TSCS, this is not necessary. The 
errors in a typical TSCS study may show panel heteroscedasticity (state errors have 
their own variances), contemporaneous correlation (error of one state correlated 
with another in the same year), or serially correlated errors (error of state is 
correlated with its previous year).  Although TSCS is able to account for such 
violations, ignoring such violations and not making the needed corrections in TSCS 
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studies results in overinflated standard errors, and thus, overestimation of model fit 
and specification.  Consequently, a study needs to check for both assumptions and 
violations.   
 
Assumptions Checks – Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation 
I first specified a baseline model in order to examine the impact of the three 
variables we know: teacher experience, educational attainment, and area of work 
(metropolitan status).  Consequently, the baseline model is:4 
 
݄݈ܶ݁ܽܿܵܽܥܱܮ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݔ݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܧ݀ݑܿ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܯ݁ݐݎ݋௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
 
 
with i representing the panel or state, and t representing the year from 1960 to 
2000, and ߚ௡ represent a vector of marginal effects of the time varying explanatory 
variables.  Thus, the ߝ௜௧ or disturbance term, will now include the variance from 
unobserved differences across states and time, as well as within states and time.  
First, I examined the degree to which teacher salaries violated the 
assumptions of Gauss Markov, common to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analyses.  
I tested for the existence of the heteroscedasticity, or whether the estimated 
variances of the residuals from the linear regression are dependent on the values of 
the independent variables.  Using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity, I 
found that the Χ2(1) statistic was 24.01 a significant at the .001 level.  Thus, I can 
                                                 
4 The baseline model refers to the basic model of factors we know influence teacher pay (e.g. controlled 
variables).  Specifically, the baseline model includes variables such as teacher experience, educational 
attainment, and metropolitan status of work. 
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reject the null hypothesis that the model is homoscedastic.   I also confirmed this by 
plotting the residuals of the linear regression against the dependent variable, and 
visually confirmed the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
In order to correct for panel heteroscedasticity, specifically contemporaneous 
correlation, I used what Beck (2001) refers to as panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE).  This is required when disturbances are not independent and identically 
distributed, as in the case of the current data set.  The variance disturbance is unique 
to each case and each pair of cases has their own covariance. This is preferred over 
the commonly used Generalized Least Squares method, or the Parks-Kmenta 
method, which has been shown to incorrectly adjust the standard errors, usually 
overly optimistic, thus resulting in over prediction or inflated model fit (Beck & 
Katz, 1995; Ramanathan, 1993).  The PCSE corrects for heteroscedasticity and the 
model uses an AR(1) process, or autoregressive process of the first order.  While and 
AR process describes a stochastic process that can be described by a weighted sum 
of its previous values and a white noise error, an AR(1) process is a first-order one, 
meaning that only the immediately previous value has a direct effect on the current 
value.  In terms of the current study, this would mean that the correction uses the 
previous year’s teacher salary data in order to correct for autocorrelation, as 
opposed to using the salary data from 2 or three years lagged.  Typically in time 
series studies, AR(1) models are used to correct for serial correlation unless there 
exists strong theoretical justification to use more than one year lagged models.   
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 The second step was to test the existence of serial correlation, or correlation 
among the residuals over time.  Again, typically in time series studies, it is expected 
that serial correlation would exists, since the reason for error in one year is likely 
related to the error in the subsequent years.  Using the Wooldridge test, which 
studies the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Based on the results, I found that the F statistic was significant (F(1,47) = 276.403, p < 
.001), and that there is a presence of serial correlation in the data.  It should also be 
noted that the type of autocorrelation is panel-specific, meaning that the correlation 
is not pooled or assumed to be the same across all states, but rather, specific to each 
state. 
 
 
Model Specification 
 I first tested whether to use either a fixed effects or random effects regression 
for the model. Typical time series studies often use fixed effects for their regression, 
since it is not a cross sectional dominated study (Western & Beckett, 1999).  In this 
type of study, random effects would be used if the data was unbalanced (meaning 
unequal N, states, to t, years) toward the N.  Although the current study is 
somewhat balanced, I wanted to use changes in the variables over time to estimate 
the effects of the controlled variables of interest on average teacher salaries 
(dependent variable).  It is cautioned that using fixed effects, when the model calls 
for random effects, can lead to a misspecified model, much like an omitted variable 
issue.   Using fixed effects has the consequence of removing any of the average state 
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to state variation, asking whether intra-state changes in the dependent variable are 
associated with the intra-state changes in the factors (D. P. Green, Kim, & Yoon, 
2003) but as Beck and Katz (2003) point out, typical TSCS analyses welcome this type 
of analysis, since the identification of panel (or differences within the panel) is the 
study of focus.  In summary, using fixed effects precluded the analyses from 
interpreting anything about the inter-state effects of the independent variables, since 
these effects have been removed. 
In order to proceed with dealing with the heteroscedasticity, I attempted to 
model it, as opposed to the previous approach of considering it a nuisance.  Each 
state has its own intercept: 
    
݄݈ܶ݁ܽܿܵܽܥܱܮ௜,௧ ൌ ݔ௜,௧ߚ଴ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ߚଵܧݔ݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܧ݀ݑܿ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܯ݁ݐݎ݋௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
 
 
where ௜݂ is a dummy variable representing the state.  To formally test if the 
model is indeed, fixed, as opposed to in-between or random, I used the Hausman 
test to test the null hypothesis of a random effects model being consistent and 
efficient, ruling out a fixed effects.  This was conducted even though fixed effects are 
typically the model of choice for TSCS data (Beck, 2001).  The results showed a 
highly significant p-value (Χ2(3)=19.65, p < .001), thus rejecting the null hypothesis 
that a random effects model would be consistent and efficient.   
 The baseline model I used to begin the analyses was as follows:  
 
݄݈ܶ݁ܽܿܵܽܥܱܮ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݔ݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܧ݀ݑܿ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܯ݁ݐݎ݋௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 As previously referenced, the descriptive statistics and correlations among 
variables can be seen in Tables 3 and 4.  Adjusting for cost of living and inflation, the 
average teacher salary has slowly increased over the past 40 years.  The average 
teacher salary across all years and states was $32,298 (SD = $5,273).  Across all years, 
New Mexico (m = $26,245; SD = $1,276), Mississippi (m = $26,586; SD = $3,736), and 
North Carolina (m = $27,293; SD = $3,210) averaged the lowest pay in teacher 
salaries after adjusting for cost of living and inflation.  The three states with the 
highest teacher pay across all years were New Jersey (m = $41,397; SD = $7,588), 
California (m = $40,058; SD = $3,207), and Michigan (m = $38,921; SD = $4,848). 5  
Although figures have been adjusted for cost of living and inflation, they have not 
been adjusted for other factors such as teacher experience, education levels, and 
other variables that provide a better comparison historically across states.   
 In terms of the Collective Bargaining Index (CBI), there was wide variability 
across states and time as measured by the 14 collective bargaining provisions.  Out 
of a possible range of -14 to 63 points (the higher the index, the more a state was 
                                                 
5 All teacher salary figures are reported in year 2000 dollars 
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considered “legally union friendly”), the mean CBI index across all states and years 
was 15.70 (SD = 19.37) for all 2,448 observations.  The mean CBI index for 1950 was 
.10 (SD = 2.35) and the mean for 2000 was 27.33 (SD = 20.12), indicating a general 
increase in unionization over time.  The maximum reported CBI values for states 
across all years were Wisconsin (32.3) and Connecticut (30.4) and the lowest index 
was Alabama (-8.3) and North Carolina (-5.4).  Figure 2 displays the average CBI 
value for each state across all 50 years. 
 
Establishing the baseline model for the study 
I needed to first understand the variance explained by the known factors of 
teacher salaries, such as teacher experience, education, and area of work 
(metropolitan).  To build the baseline model for understanding the teacher salary 
differences, I first used these variables in the model while correcting for panel 
specific AR(1) autocorrelation using single lag OLS of residuals.  The overall 
regression was linear with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck, 2001) in order to 
correct for contemporaneous correlation, as previously noted.  All variables were 
statistically significant in the positive direction at the .05 level, as expected, and each 
was a significant predictor of teacher salaries over the 40 years.  Together, these 
variables explained 77.7 percent of the variation in teacher salaries.  Results of the 
baseline model can be seen in the first column of Table 5. 
 Next, I fit a series of models to test the additional contribution of economic, 
social, and educational attainment characteristics on teacher salaries.  Each group of 
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the independent variables (e.g. economic factors) was examined separately in order 
to understand which factor(s) within each group explained the most variation on 
teacher salaries.  That was done so that I could select the minimal number of 
variables from each group to take care of any multicollinearity issues that would 
most likely occur if I used too many variables from one group.  By selecting the 
factors in each group with the strongest prediction, I used a conservative, yet 
parsimonious, approach that is explaining as much variations in teacher salaries in 
the baseline model as possible, prior to adding the CBI variable.   
I first tested the various economic variables, such as income per capita, state 
expenditures per capita, state revenue per capita and percent of state expenditures 
spent on education. Correlations among these variables showed state expenditures 
and state revenue were so highly correlated with each other (0.9882), they were 
nearly redundant.  I chose state revenue per capita in order to measure the state 
wealth and percent of funds spent on education to assess state spending on 
education.  Second, because income per capita was highly correlated with the 
dependent variable (since the dependent variable is part of the calculation of income 
per capita), I also dropped it from the study.  Consequently, I chose state revenue 
per capita (to define input) and the percent of funds spent on education (output).  I 
found that these economic factors explained an additional 14 percent of the teacher 
salary variation (R2 = 0.9026; Wald Χ2(5) = 350.61; p<.001). 
The second group of variables I tested was the educational attainment of the 
population.  Factors included the percent of the population with a Bachelor’s degree 
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and the percent of population age 5 to 17 years old enrolled in school.  When adding 
these to the model with established control variables, I found that neither variable 
was statistically significant (Percent Bachelor’s: z = 1.418, p = .139; percent enrolled: z 
= 1.82, p = .069).  Because of the degree to which youth age 5 to 17 enrolled in school 
was marginally significant, I left it in the model.   
The third group of variables I tested was the political factors, such as political 
party control and percent of the population over 65 years old.  When added to the 
already established control variables, the baseline and economic factors, political 
party control was not a significant predictor of teacher salaries and was thus 
dropped from further study.  Interestingly, the population over 65 was positively 
statistically significant (z = 2.45, p < .05) which is inconsistent with previous findings 
that have found a negative effect of an older population on teacher salaries (Walden 
& Newmark, 1995).   
When testing the demographic variables such as race and gender of teacher as 
well as student enrollment in the Free and Reduced Lunch federal program.  The 
earlier significance found for population over 65 was no longer significant and thus 
dropped from the model.  Also, the percent of teacher female was not significant (z = 
-0.79, p = .430) and dropped from further study.  Both variables may have further 
statistical influence on teacher salaries.  The race of teachers, limited to only “non 
white” due to the historical breadth of the study, was significant (z = -2.84, p < .01).  
Although the percent of free and reduced lunch was not significant at the .05 level, it 
is important to control for when making interstate comparisons, and thus left in the 
 94
model, because of the theoretical connections between student demographics and 
teacher pay.   
Thus, the final baseline model of all control variables included teacher 
education and experience, working in a metropolitan area, state revenue per capita, 
percent spent on education, percent of students enrolled in Free and Reduced lunch, 
and teacher race.  The overall baseline model was significant (Wald Χ2(9) = 361.55; 
p<.001) and explained 92.4 percent of the variance in teacher salaries from 1960 to 
2000. 
݄ܶ݁ܽܿ_݈ܵܽܽݎݕܥܱܮ௜,௧
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Question 1: How do the collective bargaining laws affect teacher pay in the last 40 years, 
after controlling for the influences of social and economic forces?? 
In order to understand the added effect of the collective bargaining laws on 
teacher salaries, I initially tested a linear relationship by including the Collective 
Bargaining Index (CBI) as an independent variable, which specifies that labor forces 
have a consistent effect on teacher salaries over 40 years.    Initially, the CBI was not 
statistically significant given a linear relationship (z = 1.50; p = 0.133).  However, 
based on the hypothesis of collective bargaining having a waning effect, I tested a 
quadratic model fit, and found that both the linear component (z = 2.49; p < 0.05) 
and the quadratic component (z = -2.25; p < 0.05), of the CBI were significant.  
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Consequently, a quadratic fit representing was the model fit used for the remainder 
of the study.  The following formula represented for Question 1 was: 
 
݄ܶ݁ܽܿ_݈ܵܽܽݎݕܥܱܮ௜,௧
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݄ܶ݁ܽܿܧݔ݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ݄ܶ݁ܽܿܧ݀ݑܿ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ݄ܶ݁ܽܿܯ݁ݐݎ݋௜,௧
൅ ߚସܧ݀ݑܿܧݔ݌݁݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚହܵݐܽݐܴ݁݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܨݎ݁݁ܮݑ݄݊ܿ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଻
൅ ݄ܶ݁ܽܿ_ܰ݋݊ݓ݄݅ݐ݁௜,௧ߚ଼ܥܤܫ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଽܥܤܫ௜,௧
ଶ ൅ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The overall model was significant (Wald Χ2 (9) = 370.64; p < .001) and 
explained 92.5 percent of the variation in teacher salaries.  Results can be seen in the 
second and third columns of Table 5. 
 
Question 2:  How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on teacher pay, controlling 
for the influence of social and economic forces, differ over various eras in school reform? 
 I originally hypothesized that collective bargaining did not have the same 
impact on teacher salaries across all years of the study, particularly in the most 
recent years.  Although the previous model results support my hypothesis (which 
showed that a quadratic model fit was indicating a gradual increase, but tapered 
off), I wanted to better understand the relationship between CBI and teacher salaries 
over various time periods.  I conducted two model tests to examine decade level 
differences of labor effects. 
 In the first model, I split the data set by the year 1980 and tested the same 
model for 1960 to 1980.  I found prior to 1980, similar results for control variables 
such as teacher experience, educational levels, etc.  The linear fit for CBI was 
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significant (z = 2.33; p < .05) and the quadratic fit was also statistically significant (z = 
-2.65; p < .01), meaning an overall positive effect of CBI, but dropping off toward 
1980.  The overall model explained 96.1 percent of the variation.  This increase in 
explained variance was to be expected, since the model only accounted for 20 years 
of the data as opposed to 40 years, having the model fit a smaller number of data 
points.  In a second model, I took data from 1980 to 2000 and fit a similar model.  
Again all other variables retained their similar statistically significance as before, 
except for the race of teachers, which was no longer statistically significant.  The 
quadratic effect of collective bargaining was also no longer significant (z = -1.78; p = 
.075).  Results can be seen in Table 6. 
 I used the same approach within each decade in order to further isolate the 
effects of collective bargaining on teacher salary variance.  I divided the data set by 
decade and created 4 separate models, similar to the one just outlined.  Results can 
be seen in Table 7.  I found that only within the 1970s was there a statistically 
significant effect of collective bargaining on teacher salaries (z = -2.14; p < .05).     
 
Question 3: How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on teacher pay, controlling 
for social and economic forces, differ by region of the country over the past 40 years? 
 In order to further understand the effects of CBI on teacher salary differences, 
I tested several models to examine any regional effects on teacher salaries.  I used an 
adjusted regional code based on the US Census and the mean for each state’s CBI for 
original and re-categorized states (see Appendix B for regional classifications of 
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states).  This created 11 geographic regions.  I then specified the same model for each 
of the 11 regions.  Model results for the Northeast region can be seen in Table 8, 
South in Table 9, Midwest in Table 10, and West in Table 11.6   
As expected, the three regions that had low CBI values, and thus either 
prohibit or do not pass provisions allowing collective bargaining, showed no 
statistically significant results the effect of collective bargaining on teacher salaries.  
Only the Mountain West region (AZ, CO, NM, UT, WY) showed a statistically 
significant relationship between collective bargaining and teacher salary variation (z 
= 2.46; p < .05).   
 Of the remaining 7 regions, the South Atlantic region (TN, FL, MD, DE) 
showed significant positive effects for collective bargaining on teacher salaries (z = 
2.71; p < .01).  Three regions showed a marginally significant relationship (p < .10): 
East North Central (IN, IL, MI, OH, and WI), Middle Atlantic, (NY, NJ, and PA), and 
the Pacific (CA, OR, WA).    
                                                 
6 Alaska and Hawaii were not included in this study because of the unique funding and organizational structures 
of their public school system.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
SUMMARIZING THE STUDY 
 The current study is the first of its kind to examine trends in teacher salaries 
over an extended longitudinal period, as a function of social, economic, and 
demographic factors as well as teacher-specific characteristics.  The results will 
hopefully prompt further research to understand the many questions posed from 
this study, as well as to use similar rigorous methodology.  Several trends were 
discovered in these analyses; however, three particular conclusions may be drawn 
with respect to the impact of collective bargaining on teacher pay.  First, collective 
bargaining’s overall influence on increasing teacher salaries from 1960 to 2000 has 
been steadily waning. Second, during the 1970s, collective bargaining laws had the 
most impact above and beyond other influences.  Third, the collective bargaining 
provisions influence specific geographical regions differently. 
 
Impact of Collective Bargaining  
 In terms of collective bargaining, the results confirm the original hypothesis 
that stated unions have had a significant but slowing effect on teacher pay based on 
the positive linear, but negative quadratic relationship found from the model.  As 
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found in other studies, unions appear to have been successful in increasing teacher 
pay once educators became organized.  Most likely, because initially, teacher unions 
were well organized and had more resources to use for negotiations and bargaining.  
The initial strength of unions was surprising for many school board officials who 
underestimated the willingness of teachers to unionize, as well as the legal muscle 
that could be flexed in the public setting (Loveless, 2000).  Prior to unionizing, 
teachers had been underpaid and under recognized, so unionizing may have helped 
achieve the incremental pay jumps that were found in the results.   
 The results from the second set of models supports the second part of the 
hypothesis –collective bargaining provisions had the most impact during the 1970s, 
above and beyond other influences, but have had little if any effect in the last two 
decades.  Based on the negative quadratic model fit (versus a positive linear), union 
effect has tapered off, resulting in a limited influence in terms of improving teacher 
pay.    This study is limited in its explanation for why collective bargaining had a 
waning influence over time.  One possible explanation based o the effect sizes of the 
factors included in the study, I would argue that the significant influence of state 
wealth influences (explaining almost 14 percent of the teacher variation), there may 
exist a financial limitation for how much pay increase unions can achieve under a 
publicly-funded profession such as teaching.  A majority of teachers are still paid 
based on public taxes, making them susceptible to factors such as state revenue, 
political support, and public approval.  Unlike the private sector, where wages are 
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determined by production, profits, and managerial support, public education 
competes for a limited pot of available funds.   
Beyond the ability to pay teachers higher due to financial constraints, 
perceptions surrounding the professional identity of teaching debate affect how 
dollar amounts equate to teachers’ pay.  Teachers have greatly improved their 
professional status from the days of the single room schoolhouse, but they do not 
receive the same professional merit or respect as medicine or law.  One obvious 
contrast is the gender differences that exist between these comparisons, with law 
and medicine being mostly male dominated, much like the higher pay found in 
school administration.  There also exists an ideological struggle (and evolution) 
between the NEA and the AFT has garnered public scrutiny for decades.  Over 
previous decades, collective bargaining strategies have shifted between amicable 
negotiations to the extreme of organized strikes; the profession continually seeks a 
balance between teacher demands and public expectations.  The public must 
perceive the teachers’ status as white-collar professionals in order to support and 
approve and promote increased teacher pay.  The incremental boosts in wages that 
unions have fought for over the years are beneficial, but the larger, symbolic wage 
increases have not been achieved.  Teachers’ pay expectations do not reflect the 
integrity and dedication equated with the professional status currently associated 
with the occupation.   
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Historical Trends 
 Based on the current results, collective bargaining appears to have had the 
greatest impact on teacher salary differentiation in their first part of its existence, 
and more specifically in the 1970s.  In fact, no statistical relationship arises between 
collective bargaining and growth in teacher salaries in the last two decades included 
in the study’s considerations.  These findings reflect the larger trend of teacher 
union evolution and support the original hypotheses of a possible “ceiling effect” of 
union influence on teacher pay. 
 In my opinion, a closer study surrounding the historical events support the 
lack of finding any significant effect in the 1960s, namely, the passing of the laws 
and the rise of state teacher associations.  Many identify the decade of the 1960s with 
an undeniable attention garnered by teacher unions.  A majority of the national 
media spotlight focused on the 1960 New York teacher strike and the publicity that 
gave rise to nearly 300 other unions that followed.  However, most initial activity 
occurred only in the major metropolitan areas where local labor unions strengthened 
the organization of teacher unions.  The NEA lost several major elections to the AFT, 
but it remained powerful through its representation in both rural and non-urban 
areas (Murphy, 1990).   In fact, the largest membership enrollments of the NEA 
occurred in the years 1972 through 1975 (US Census Bureau, 2005), where they 
experienced the only double-digit percentage increases in membership over the last 
seven decades.  Because the current study focused on teacher salaries for all districts 
(state averages), it is more likely that the effect of collective bargaining at the state 
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level occurred much later than most district level studies due to the reluctance of 
unionizing in districts outside larger municipalities. 
 It seems that the NEA (and the AFT to some extent) began to wield its 
influence and organization at the state level in the 1970s.  The 1970 NEA convention 
saw a drastic reorganization, creating a leaner, more strategic organization that 
shifted its focus from white collar to blue collar negotiation tactics.  The NEA helped 
form the Coalition of American Public Employees, which proved that it can operate 
with other labor groups, a monopoly that the AFT enjoyed for a majority of its 
existence (Murphy, 1990).  The NEA also improved the organization of its state level 
associations, which helped all districts within a given state to diversify its resources 
and spread unions overall influence.  If the 1960s is viewed as the building period 
based on the membership spike, the 1970s could be considered the era when the 
machine began to run.  
 Beyond the education world, several social changes were also occurring that 
impacted teacher salary increases in the 1970s.  Collectively, the United States was 
reeling from the empowerment of the Civil Rights movement.  This movement not 
only produced a cohort of effective women leaders in union positions, it additionally 
fostered opportunities for leadership roles both in education and in policy making.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 that defined gender discrimination did not initially 
apply to educators until it was amended in 1972. Union’s involvement in these 
issues showed its compassion, not just as an advocacy group for teachers, but 
bolstered a larger battle pitted against gender discrimination.  Bargaining for better 
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wages would be best serviced if policy makers were more receptive and 
understanding (Ravitch, 1983).  Two other factors were influencing the profession: a 
general decline in incoming teachers with academic achievement and a general 
concern in the quality of public education (Lanfkord & Wyckoff, 1997).  These could 
contribute to the overall average pay, based on educational experience, and the 
public’s willingness to support pay increases in a period of sharp inflation. 
 It is important to preface the professional advances of women with the 
perceived advances of racial equality, and the findings of this study are hesitantly 
optimistic that such gains were made.  Results shows that from 1960 to 1980, for 
each percent increase in nonwhite teachers at the state level, teachers were paid 
approximately $45 less. This becomes apparent when comparing similar social and 
economic characteristics of a state.  Because this was a state level analysis, the 
difference should not be interpreted as nonwhite teachers being paid less than white 
teachers within the same district, but rather (when controlling for similar state 
demographic and economic characteristics), states that had greater diversity in 
demographic workforces tended to pay teachers less.  It is less clear as to why these 
pay differences existed. Further qualitative or historical analysis would better serve 
the purpose of gaining insight into specific possibilities for these differences.  
However, in the current study, no significant relationship affecting racial 
inequalities was found in the years after 1980, concluding that race of the teacher 
population at the state level was no longer a significant factor in determining teacher 
salary variation.  
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Regional Differences 
 From the results, I found that collective bargaining strategies have had varied 
effects in different geographical regions.  In fact, it appears that collective bargaining 
has had more of an effect in regions based on the types of bargaining provisions 
rather than the geographical location.  Specifically, regions that adopted middle-of-
the-road provisions, ranging in CBI values from approximately 4 to 21, tended to 
have the most impact on teacher salary differences.  These values were indicative of 
states that either passed various policies allowing collective bargaining (such as 
meet and confer guidelines), or promoted collective bargaining but restricted some 
of the more liberal union tactics such as striking or agency shops.   
Several plausible explanations may exist for the result of intermediate CBI 
values found in certain states.  First, this study specifically examined teacher wages 
and the direct effects of collective bargaining.  Teacher benefits and working 
conditions were not measured in this study.  So, teacher unions may have had more 
of an effect in improving benefits and work conditions, despite a limited effect 
found on increasing teacher pay.  Second, the regions that found a significant effect 
of collective bargaining provisions are geographically located between regions of 
significantly lower and higher pay regions.  The first region, the South Atlantic 
Union region (TN, FL, MD, DE), falls statistically in between two border regions 
(New England and Southeast) where teachers are paid at significantly different rates 
when controlling for all other variables.  Because the evidence exhibits some slight 
spillover effect, these four states may have served as a bridge between lower 
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(Southeast) and higher pay states (Middle Atlantic).  Prior to collective bargaining, 
these states may have been teetering between two separate salary approaches for 
teachers. Unionization may have helped motivate these states to increase overall pay 
based on the regional differences.  In other words, there may have been a gradual 
tendency to match teacher pay to the higher paying districts.7   
A second explanation may be the various political implications regarding 
specific legislative decisions. In both regions, laws were passed to limit unionization, 
but statutes left power to delegate the managing of certain groups.  In these regions, 
some states are considered “right to work states,” by allowing teachers to either 
choose to join the local union or not.  There were restrictions placed on labor strikes, 
which is generally considered a labor union strategy for negotiation stalemates.  In 
both regions, teacher unions would generally be regulated by stringent negotiation 
provisions versus a traditional worker picket like a traditional as historically 
observed in the auto industry or certain service sectors.  This balance, as outlined by 
respective collective bargaining statutes, may have also helped refine the image of 
public school teachers, and ultimately, sway public approval for unionizing efforts.  
The general public seems comfortable with viewing teachers as individuals who 
commit to a moral cause, perform public service, and select teaching because of a 
“calling,” similar to the profession of the ministry.  The image of teachers as a card-
holding union member striking for better work conditions has consistently been 
                                                 
7 Models testing decade within region showed similar results to Question 2, with collective bargaining having a 
significant effect for time closer to the passage of collective bargaining, however, regional effects within 
decades was not fully developed for the current study.   
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negatively viewed.  It is possible that collective bargaining provisions have helped 
foster the balance of unions approach and promote the organization of teachers, 
however, restrictions may temper hard-line negotiating tactics used in some of the 
industrial labor sectors. 
 
General Conclusions about Collective Bargaining 
 Synthesizing these results leads to three formidable conclusions: 1) Collective 
bargaining has had an overall positive effect on teacher pay over the past 40 years, 
although its influence is apparently waning, 2) collective bargaining has had the 
largest effect on pay in the 1970s, and 3) collective bargaining has affected regions 
that have adopted compromised provisions, rather than an outright prohibiting or 
unduly adoption of teacher unions.  In terms of reflecting on my original 
hypotheses, I initially conjectured that states considered “nonunion states,” have 
been consistently increasing teacher pay, closing in on the national average and 
making up for grounds stymied in the decades when teacher unions were first 
attempting organization.  However results have not confirmed these hypotheses.  
The pay differences that exhibited between union and nonunion states prior to the 
1960s remained largely unchanged.  Figure 3 displays regressed values of teacher 
salaries, controlling for all variables and adjusting salaries to be constant at the 
dollar value for the year 2000, for both union and nonunion states.  Plotting this over 
the 40 years of study, I found that there existed a general parallel relationship 
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between union and nonunion states.  In order to thoroughly understand how these 
differences have changed over time, I then calculated the percent differences 
between the two, and again plotted them over the 40 years (See Figure 3 and Figure 
4).   
Two immediate conclusions can be drawn from these figures: 1) teacher pay 
has been on a steady but slow increase over the last 40 years in both union and 
nonunion states, and 2) the difference between the two salaries has slowly been 
narrowing since the 1970s.   Studying the percentage differences, the largest pay 
difference between the two groups of states existed in 1960, a time when union 
states paid almost 11 percent higher than nonunion states, controlling for all other 
variables.  Between 1960 and 1967, this difference decreased to almost 6 percent.  In 
the 1970s, the pay difference increased to only about 9 percent in 1978, and then 
gradually (and quickly) declined back to 6 percent in 1987.  In terms of collective 
bargaining, this data supports a “spillover effect,” which clams that districts or 
states that may not unionize or, benefit from neighboring districts or states that do 
unionize (Gallagher, 1978).   
These “parallel” trends could invite explanations outside the “teacher union 
argument” presented in this study.  Because union and nonunion states appeared to 
increases and decrease together, other factors that are acting on the profession may 
be contributing to the changes.  These factors are driving the profession, regarded of 
teacher union existence.  Such factors may be as overt as historical events such as 
war time or recession, or as covert as national perception of teacher pay.  Although 
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this study is limited in its ability to present various hypotheses, including average 
salaries from other professions could provide a relative comparison for pay trends.  
For example, using state government employee salaries as a comparison, one may be 
able to understand if the slowdowns that occurred in the 1970s were indicative on 
public employees in general, or just teachers.  Likewise, using other comparable 
professions that may be characterized by similar gender differences between worker 
and manager (such as nursing) may help to understand and interpret the gains in 
relation to the gender debate of teaching. 
In terms of the trends from Figure 4, the increase in percent difference 
provides evidence that union states began to pay their teachers more, as much as 7 
percent more than nonunion states toward the end of the 1970s. After 1980, 
nonunion states began to “catch up,” either because of the incremental salary gains 
made in union states, or because of a “cooling effect” of sudden teacher raises in 
union states.  In the last twenty years, there has been no major shift in higher pay for 
union states, and in fact, the opposite appears to have occurred.  Thus, union states 
do pay teachers more than nonunion states.  However, these states have always paid 
teachers more, even before the advent of collective bargaining.  This calls into 
question whether collective bargaining laws were the actual catalyst for the pay 
increases. 
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Factors Related to Teacher Salaries 
 As expected, three variables were the main contributors to the overall 
variance in increases in teacher salaries: teacher education, occupational experience, 
and work environment.  Following the logic of the single salary schedule, almost 
every school district in the country uses the standard, stepped pay scale: teachers are 
paid incrementally, based on earned education credits and cumulative years of 
experience.  Factors related to the work environment were equally important.  
Similar to the results found by other researchers such as Chambers (1995) and 
Stoddard (2005), teachers are paid more in proximity to larger cities.  These three 
variables contributed to over 77 percent of the variation in teacher pay over the past 
40 years.   
 Beyond these established factors, the results show that economic state 
capacity also contributes to a significant variation in teacher pay.  Economics factors 
influence teacher salary variation more so than the social, demographic, or general 
education level of a given population segment.  This follows that education is a 
compensated public service; that is, the more spending power a state has, the more it 
can pay for such services since state revenue is a function of wealth and tax effort 
(Goertz, 1998).  As school funding inequity becomes closely linked with student 
achievement and opportunity, such a finding can bolster the argument that states 
either need to improve their overall funding of education or seek other means to 
supplement the funding.  States have become the overseer of equity within their 
borders (Burbridge, 2002).  Some states have eliminated local funding for education 
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and instead, turned to a state funding as a sole provider or monetary resources.  
Other states have eliminated local property taxes in order to evenly distribute 
funding throughout all its districts.  Although these findings do not endorse either 
method, they support the fact that wealth and teacher pay are closely related, 
regardless of governmental entity (local or state). 
 Perhaps the most troubling result from the model was the impact of race on 
teacher pay, controlling for students enrolled in the federally subsidized Free and 
Reduced Lunch program.    For every percent increase in nonwhite teachers, this 
study found a decrease in average pay of $54.  If you consider the border states of 
California or Texas, or southern states such as Georgia and the Carolinas, a greater 
amount of diversity exists among its teaching force. Based on the study’s findings, 
this disparity may be quite significant.  Because this is the first study that includes 
accounting for the race of teachers in a historical analysis, this disturbing finding 
necessitates performing additional research to investigate this result.  A conclusive 
interpretation of these results would emphasize that nonwhite teachers are not paid 
lower that white teachers within the same state.  Instead, states that have a higher 
number of nonwhite teachers are paid less, controlling for all other factors.   
 
Factors Found Unrelated to Salaries 
Two variables showed no statistically significant affect on teacher salary 
variation: the gender of teachers and the age of the voting population.  After further 
review, I believe the insignificance was confined to the current organization of the 
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study, as opposed to any generalizations made on teaching salaries.  One particular 
study, compiled data though by the Schools and Staffing Survey data concluded that 
the gender of teachers does have significant bearing concerning pay (Chambers, 
1995).  This finding raised speculation, since was based on a limited time frame, 
however, the question remains: are females paid inferior compared to males?   
Initially, the immediate answer would be “no,” since according to a generic 
teaching salary schedule, it is impossible to vary pay on the basis of gender.  
Furthermore, one could argue that men have greater tenure than female teachers, so 
they would be paid higher according to their overall teaching experience.  
According to the current study, controlling for all such factors, there is still no 
immediate, relevant effect on teacher pay. 
In order to accurately answer this inconsistency, I would argue that a study 
based on a smaller unit analysis, such as district or county, would more accurately 
address the discrepancy.  A state level designs sample polls of all teachers from a 
particular state. This reduces the likelihood for units (in this case, states), to have 
wide variety of percent of the teaching workforce polled to be primarily female.  In 
the current study, the average percentage of the teaching population was 69.8 
percent female with a standard deviation of 1.2 percent across all 2,448 observations.  
At this level, there was limited variation among the states in order to compare 
differences.  It would be more appropriate to contrast two districts with similar 
characteristics, but varying percentages of a gendered workforce.  
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The current study also found no evidence of an older population (percent of 
65 years old) affecting teacher salary variation.  The assumption follows that the 
older a districts population becomes, the less likely this age demographic would 
vote to support education spending increases. Consequently, this assumption 
indirectly limits potential increases in teacher pay.  This powerful voting group has 
been shown to be less supportive of increased tax spending (Preston, 1984; Ward, 
1988) and less likely to support tax increases (Miller, 1996).  Burbridge (2002) shows 
the elderly population having a positive impact on spending for education but a 
negative impact on tax effort, which indirectly influences education spending.  Yet, 
in this study, no effects were found between the elderly voting demographic and 
varying teacher salary differences. 
The only reason that could potentially explain the statistical anomaly of this 
age populations’ conservative education spending tendencies is a consistently 
increasing lifespan.  Because this study covers a period over 40 years, the life 
expectancy in the 1960 was lower than in the year 2000.  Statistically, a greater 
lifespan increases the population of citizens older than 65.  Any gain in teacher 
salaries over the past 40 years varies concurrently with an increase in the percent of 
the population margin greater than 65 years old.  In order to test this hypothesis, I 
would introduce test the model within a limited time frame in order to “cut off” any 
significant increases in population growth for percent of citizens over 65 years old.    
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 Although the current study has a number of relevant and plausible strengths, 
it is important to understand the study’s limitations.  First and foremost, this study 
attempts to look at teacher salaries for 48 states over a 40-year time period.  Various 
factors acting within states are not accounted for as well as the several factors acting 
on the economic variables or that define the labor relations within a state.  Few 
quantitative studies can or should proclaim its accounting for all the social, 
economic, and political forces acting on states to produce such differences.  As James 
(1991) states, “Cultural configurations, technological and economic development, 
professionalization, class conflict, social mobility, and crises such as wars and 
depressions” (p. 176), all contribute to the tug and pull of educational change, as 
well as educational funding.  It is unlikely and unreasonable that a quantitative 
research could proclaim its accounting for all these factors using measures and 
scales to test interactions.   
But this study still can act as a “first step” to understanding the trends and 
changes in teacher pay over time.  It is the first of its kind to look at teacher salaries 
using a large scale historical database, with uniform measures and rigorous analytic 
examination of questions of interest.  It also explains 92 percent of the variation in 
teacher pay, accounting for the primary variables of influence for economic social, 
demographic, and labor factors.  If anything, it should be used as a platform for 
further quantitative and qualitative studies, in order to understand the various 
historical factors that are not being accounted for.  Based on this study’s uniqueness 
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in approach, I offer limitations plus areas where improvements could be made, some 
speaking more to a conceptual or theoretical improvement rather than one that is 
attainable with our current data collection. 
 
Unionization versus Collective Bargaining 
 The conceptual difference of unionizing versus collective bargaining is crucial 
to understanding the parameters of this study.  Based on the independent variable, I 
have studied the collective bargaining effects on teacher salaries, or the legal 
provisions that a state allows its teachers to organize its labor force.  Although these 
provisions are critical for the allowance (and development) of teacher unions, it does 
not measure the activity of unionization, or the local activity that elicits new 
membership and ultimately feeds (both financially and representatively) the state 
and local organizations.   
Unionization does not occur unless state laws permit collective bargaining; 
conversely, the reverse may not necessarily be true.  States may bargain without 
local unions.  In states that have permitted as well as prohibited collective 
bargaining, state level teacher associations have amassed a great deal of power by 
representing all teachers within a particular state. The result provides an impressive 
collection of combined voting power.  Even if this representation is not formally 
established through dues or membership, these state level associations are 
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sometimes billed as one of the top legislative lobbying presences, influencing both 
written policy and policy makers.   
In terms of the current study, this phenomenon poses challenges towards its 
ability to generalize the study’s findings over the teacher unionization movement.  
Through the use of measuring political contributions, membership percentages, or 
possibly their lobbying presence, a criteria may be established for  gauging the 
political presence of state associations  All of these variables (and the admission of 
additional variables), serve as legitimate methods to measure union presence in a 
given state, district or unit.  Perhaps, once these variables are collected and 
controlled, states that have been traditionally considered “nonunion” make look and 
measure like states that are labeled “union.”  Thus, stating that collective bargaining 
has no significant impact on teacher salaries may imply neglect in accounting for the 
power and influence of state associations. 
State level associations comprise another layer of teacher organization.   
Because they operate outside the collective bargaining and unionizing concept, they 
were not included in this study.  These associations realize the necessity for voicing 
a presence at the state level--especially in states where pay is set up as a state level 
salary base with additional funding through local supplements.  By omitting their 
presence in the current study may seem potentially deficient for drawing 
conclusions on the influence teacher unions. However, I could argue that state level 
associations are not considered unions.  State level associations operate under a 
different dynamic than local teacher unions.  Associations operate more subtle in 
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accordance with the strategies associated with white collar professionalism-- 
influencing policy through special interest politics.  The strength of the local labor 
approach involves the unified decision making of its members. They resort 
specifically on the ability to cancel production if they are not in accord with the 
firm’s policies.  Schools are not a separate entity from the community as may be the 
case with a firm or company.  The leverage derived from shutting down a school 
may be beneficial in the short term, but this tactic can create rifts within the local 
community.  Instead, the bargaining process may be best served when organized as 
through an association either at the state or local level. 
This study confirms that the legal framework governing collective bargaining 
has had a limited affect on teacher salary variation.  As Figure 3 shows, the 
differences between teacher pay in union versus nonunion states has not changed 
much over the past 40 years. Comparatively, when measuring the percent 
differences, salary gaps between union and nonunion states actually diminished.   
Future research could potentially determine the influence of teacher associations 
versus collective bargaining in order to draw additional comparisons.  
 
Benefits and Work Conditions 
 Teacher unions do not narrow their bargaining power to negotiating wages 
and salaries.  As demonstrated through the literature review, unions have served to 
draw considerations surrounding working conditions and employee benefits.  
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Benefits, including health insurance, comprise an important aspect of compensation, 
and one could argue that teacher pay should include health coverage as an integral 
part of measuring overall pay (Eberts & Stone, 1987).  In terms of examining 
working conditions, the issue becomes more abstract to study quantitatively.  It may 
include the number of different classes on a teacher’s workload which can 
substantially increase a teacher’s workload.  Unpaid duties such as cafeteria or bus 
supervision cannot be measured as a component of teacher pay, but their existence 
improves the overall working and learning environment. At times, teacher unions 
regulate how and when additional responsibilities beyond instructional duties are 
assigned to staff members.   Strictly measuring salaries may not capture the overall 
benefits or responsibilities of working conditions within a state or district that has 
unionized pay. 
 Although future studies will need to examine other key indicators, we know 
that pay and benefits are correlated (Barro, 1993).  Consequently, findings may 
expose similar relationships amongst benefits and pay as illustrated between 
relating collective bargaining and pay.  Drawing from the literature, it appears that 
teacher unions facilitated dialogue about various work condition issues, such as the 
number of preps assigned or unfair staff transfer policies.  Unions helped break 
through the impasse that existed long before collective bargaining (Fuller, Mitchell, 
& Hartman, 2000; Hannaway & Rotherham, 2006).  These issues leached into 
districts and states that either prohibited collective bargaining or had not adopted 
the union approach.  This study does not include potential improvements in work 
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conditions, mostly due to the individual subjectivity in measuring for these changes. 
To remain consistent, the study draws conclusions on the quantifiable relationships 
between pay and collective bargaining. 
 
Comparable Wages 
Considerable debate arises concerning the implications of “comparable 
professions” when contrasting teacher salaries to other professions.  Wage rates and 
labor market conditions in comparable professional and white collar careers are 
likely to figure prominently in relation to any empirical explanation of teacher salary 
levels (Barro, 1993; Stoddard, 2005; Taylor & Keller, 2003).  For example, many male 
teachers left the profession in the early 1900s to seek better wages (Elsbree, 1941).  
Women would experience similar professional opportunities almost a half a century 
later. In the last thirty years, females have competed within an ever-expanding array 
of occupational prospects previously available only to men.  This permeated the 
primarily exclusive pool (unfortunately based on discrimination nonetheless) of 
female teacher candidates.   In terms of skills, the occupational job market pays a 
premium for those with a knowledge base in math and sciences. The demand has 
resulted in a depletion of qualified candidates possessing the background deeming 
persons ‘qualified’ to teach the subject material.   
 These criticisms are often misunderstood due to using comparable wages to 
adjust for or control against the dependent data of teacher salaries.  The first method, 
using comparable wages for adjusting teacher wages, is statistically sound but 
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theoretically problematic.  If a comparable profession, defined by requiring the same 
qualifications and general experience as teaching were to be paid differently in one 
region versus another, then teacher salaries would be adjusted in order to control for 
this difference.  Because professions in a market economy seek better wages and 
working conditions for its employees, differences in a non-teaching profession will 
help control for the pay differences in a teaching profession.  To further understand 
how this consideration affects adjustments, the following mathematical example 
(albeit hypothetical), is depicted.  Comparing teacher salaries in two different 
regions averaging $45,000 and $50,000 respectively, the difference will be compared 
to the average salaries of comparable professions, which for example, would be 
$50,000 and $75,000.  Despite teachers making $5,000 more in the second region, this 
will be adjusted (probably lower) because in relation to the salaries of the 
comparable profession, teachers are paid substantially lower.  Thus, using other 
typical cost of living adjustments such as rent prices, the Consumer Price Index, and 
other economic factors, the adjusted salaries for teachers in the second region may 
be less than the teachers in the first region (Chambers, 1981).  Adjusting teacher 
salaries based on the criteria of comparable wages has been used in previous wage 
studies (Stoddard, 2005; Taylor & Keller, 2003). 
 Using comparable wages is relevant to outlining teacher wage research, but 
not as a means for adjusting salaries.  The mere definition of comparable profession 
implies that the same market forces acting on teaching are acting collectively on 
these careers.  This extrapolation resides on the implausible assumptions that two 
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different profession parallel trends in terms of competition, equilibrium, and 
mobility in the labor market.  By adjusting for comparable wages across two 
different regions, this assumes that the factors resulting in the wage differences are 
comparable (Goodson, 2003). More often than not, teaching is a public sector job 
which resists many private sector market trends (Gyurko & Tracy, 1991).  Although 
teacher wage increases are subject to economic trends such as inflation rates and 
supply and demand theory, the teaching profession, surrenders itself to the 
availability of adequate revenue funding, strong community support, and positive 
public image.  For these reasons, adjusting teacher salaries by controlling for wages 
in “comparable professions” is inherently flawed. 
 The better application of comparable wages should be used as a factor 
contributing to wage trends, rather than in an adjustment index.  The use of 
comparable wages as a proxy for the cost of teachers rests implicitly on the theory of 
intersector competition for labor and intersector wage (Barro, 1993).  The teaching 
profession continually competes with other professions for workers.  If the wages for 
other professions are considerably high in one particular area, teaching 
opportunities in that region must also be lucrative enough to recruit eligible 
candidates.  This should not be interpreted as teacher salaries being comparable to 
other professions, but rather teacher salaries must be consistent enough compared to 
the teacher salaries in other districts.  Although some findings have tried to separate 
the idea that teachers are motivated by monetary rewards (Borgersrode, 1942; 
Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959), more recent studies have better defined 
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the relationship between teachers and salaries.  Teacher pay may not be a recruiting 
motivator, but it does influence decisions on entering the profession (Jenkins, Mitra, 
Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Odden & Kelly, 1997), the ability to work in difficult school 
conditions (Einhorn, 2001; Frase, 1992), and decision to leave the profession 
(Murnane & Olsen, 1990).   
The difficulty in determining comparability resides with what professions to 
include in such a contrast.  “Comparable professions,” based on similar years of 
training and educational levels have been defined from careers ranging from 
accounting to nursing.  There is a tendency to over-generalize these comparisons.  
Nursing has been used as a comparable profession because it, like teaching, was one 
of the few professional opportunities open to women prior to the 1960s.  Accounting 
has been used as an effort to match careers of similar professional status, although 
again, these comparisons have little if any theoretical basis or occupational 
similarity.  Other methods include grouping several professions’ salaries, using only 
manufacturing wages (since they too are unionized), and even comparing private 
sector teaching salaries.  Although all methods seem to present as many benefits as 
hesitations in some instances, most literature agrees that such a comparison be 
made, based on economic theory; however, this aspect falls short of defining the 
control group. 
 In terms of teacher salaries, perhaps a future inquiry would look at the gains 
made of a similar class of compensated employees, state government workers. This 
would be integrated in a comparison of salary differences rather than absolute value 
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comparisons.  State workers include all levels of professional status, and do not 
encapsulate one group that is similar to teachers.  But the trends and growth that 
state workers’ experiences could be a proxy for better understanding the trends in 
the teaching profession. If the gains found in teacher pay mirror that of state 
governmental employees, than this may be attributed more to the overall economy 
rather than something specific within education.  Or, if the teacher associations are 
shown to be closely aligned with state worker associations, these gains may show a 
larger effort by public worker unions to work together in influencing higher pay.  
Unlike other limitations, state governmental pay and collective bargaining laws do 
exist for the time period of study, and could aid in analyzing how isolated or 
parallel the teacher pay trends are to the larger publicly compensated professions. 
 
Including Private Schools 
 Although this study does include charter school teachers and all teachers 
working in public schools it does not account for the large number of private school 
teachers working across the country.  The exclusion of private school teachers was 
omitted for two reasons: 1) it is unclear as to how the unionization movement has 
impacted private school teachers, and 2) the private school system is loosely 
connected, in terms of organizational structure and culture.  Private school teacher 
salaries do not follow the same factors as public school pay.  They are not dependent 
on local tax money or public support.  Financially, compensation is often generated 
independently, and their success is more in part to their overall enrollment and 
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customer base.  In fact, it could be argued that in order to appropriately study 
private school wages, one would need to account for a variety of other economic 
factors that are not relevant to this study.  
 Despite this decision, because the study does not include private schools, 
these findings cannot be generalized to this type of teacher profession.  Future 
studies could use private school teacher pay as a comparison for public school pay.  
This comparison could be used to better understand the long term trends of teacher 
pay, but I would argue that a district or even state level approach may be 
problematic.  I would propose that national averages should be used in order to 
aggregate the collective whole, since private schools are organized quite different in 
terms of socioeconomic accessibility.   
 
Measuring Political Influence 
 The findings from this study suggested that there was little if any impact for 
political effect.  For example, the study found no effect of political solidarity, defined 
by one party control across state House, Senate, and governor’s office.  It also found 
no effect between the population over 65 and increases in teacher pay based on the 
previously mentioned reasons.  For future analysis, two improvements should be 
made in order to better understand how the political effect may help drive or 
suppress teacher pay.  First, I would propose looking beyond the political party 
solidarity, and instead looking at the individual states’ approaches to developing 
policy.  There are several competing groups for state and local funds, and although 
 124
it is generally assumed that the Democratic Party generally supports education 
funding increases, the ideology of the state, and its citizens, is not consistent across 
all states.  The voting patterns and the ideology of the policy makers and citizens 
may be more important than their political party affiliation.  For example, several 
southern states have had voted in Democratic governors and state legislatures, but 
in some states, the ideology may be very conservative (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & 
Hanson, 1998).   
Beyond ideology, there also exists a culture that varies among states 
(Marshall & Gerstl-Pepin, 2005).  “These political cultures are not defined by borders 
but by traditions” that can predominate beyond the simple political party label (p. 
169). The difficulty in including these cultures over the current study is the 
appropriate label applied.  Although not often, state culture may change, especially 
considering the longitudinal nature of the study.  Also, this state culture may be 
defined more by the issue than the service.  To further improve the measure of state 
culture, Marshall et al. (1989) suggest including the state’s underlying public values 
taken defined by the several political actors, legal provisions passed within a state, 
and other stakeholders of influence.  In terms of the current study, it is unlikely that 
the collective bargaining provisions were passed and enforced under the same 
culture and value system, despite a parallel in the scope of bargaining.   
 Despite the limitations in using ideology or state culture, specifically on the 
comprehensive data collection needed to account for culture and public values, I 
would propose that both methods can better capture the political effects on teacher 
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differences.  In terms of applying these approaches to methods similar to the current 
study, it is advised to limit the time period to one that can account for state influence 
defined by Marshall et al. in order to better control for differences that may occur 
over time within a state.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Findings from the current study provide new ways to understand where and 
how the legal provisions of collective bargaining have impacted teacher pay from 
1960 to 2000.  Based on the results, it is apparent that gains in teacher pay were 
positively impacted by collective bargaining provisions soon after they were passed 
as well as in certain areas of the country.  Also, there is evidence to suggest that 
states with collective bargaining provisions beyond just “no provisions” but short of 
a full prescription of legal allowances, tends to show the most progress in teacher 
pay, when controlling for all other variables.  Finally, teacher pay, regardless of 
union or nonunion states, has experienced a parallel and gradual increase over the 
past 40 years.  It is apparent that union states pay teachers significantly higher than 
nonunion states; however, this difference has remained steady across all years, even 
prior to collective bargaining.  The ability for nonunion states to stay with the 
increases in union states might be evidence for the strength of state associations to 
pressure the state to keep pace with unionized states or it could be evidence of a 
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larger and slower, uniform increase of professional pay that invites a host of other 
players, factors, and social trends. 
 In terms of how these findings can best be used for policy, my enthusiasm for 
the innovation and rigor of these findings, as well as the utilization of rich 
methodology and newly available Census data on teachers, must be tempered with 
the expansiveness of the study.  I must respect what James (1991) calls, “the elusive 
dream” of political researchers, who seek to collect predictors and categorize 
influences in order to influence the policy making process.  These findings can be 
part of larger effort to improve what we know about teacher pay, by understanding 
the complexities of educational change and accounting for these changes utilizing 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  I also must recognize the politically 
charged nature of teacher unions, and hope that such findings not be ill-used for this 
debate.  Although it is my firm belief that research (regardless of approach) is the 
best tool for understanding change, I hope that this study adds to the rigor of the 
methods and lenses we use to study teacher salaries, in hopes that soon, we will 
better understand how teacher compensation has changed over time.   
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Table 1: Research Questions for Current Study 
 
 
 
 Questions 
  
Question 1 How do the collective bargaining laws affect teacher pay 
in the last 50 years, after controlling for the influences of 
social and economic forces? 
  
 
Question 2 
 
How do the collective bargaining laws affect teacher pay 
in the last 50 years, after controlling for the influences of 
social and economic forces? 
 
 
Question 3 
 
How does the influence of collective bargaining laws on 
teacher pay, controlling for social and economic forces, 
differ by region of the country over the past 40 years? 
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Table 2: Variables used in Current Study and Sources for Data 
 
Category Variable Source 
Dependent Average Teacher Salaries US Census (rate of increase from 
National Education Association) 
 
Labor Collective bargaining provisions Valletta and Freeman (1988), 
Rueben (email commun., 2007) 
 
Teacher 
Statistics 
Experience IPUMS (2006) 
 Education IPUMS (2006) 
 Place of work (Metropolitan) IPUMS (2006) 
 Race IPUMS (2006) 
 Gender IPUMS (2006) 
Economics Revenue US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
 Expenditures Total US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
 Expenditures on Education US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
 Per Capita Income US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
 Per Pupil Expenditure US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
 Cost of Living Index Historical Cost of Living Index 
(Berry et al, 2000)  
 
Social Percent with Bachelor’s US Census 
 Percent of 5 – 17 year olds enrolled in school US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
 Free and Reduced Lunch enrollment US Annual Statistical Abstracts 
Political State Party Control T. Storey, National Council of 
State Legislatures (email 
commun., 2007) 
 
 Population over 65 US Census 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables  
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
    
Teacher Salaries (in 2000 dollars) $32,298 $5,273 1,968 
Collective Bargaining Index 15.7 19.3 2,448 
Teacher Age (years) 40.34 1.93 2,448 
Teacher Educational Attainment 3.18 0.21 2,448 
Teacher Race - Percent White 90.7 9.71 2,448 
-  Percent Black 7.98 9.91 2,448 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 41.8 23.1 2,448 
Population over 65 (percent) 10.7 2.26 2,448 
Bachelor’s (percent) 13.7 6.33 2,448 
High School Diploma (percent) 59.0 17.0 2,448 
Education Expenditures K-12  $3.88 x 109 $4.74 x 109 1,968 
                 Per Pupil (in 2000 dollars) $4,602 $1,985 1,968 
Income per capita (in 2000 dollars) $19,743 $5,580 1,968 
State Spending on Education K-16 (percent) 35.0 8.93 2,400 
State Revenue per Capita (in 2000 dollars) $2,278 $922 1,968 
Percent Enrolled 5 – 17 years olds 87.9 6.55 2,448 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) 50.9 17.4 2,304 
State Party Control (Democrat = -1; Split = 
0, Republican = 1) 
 
-0.16 0.70 2,448 
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Table 4: Correlations among Variables of Interest 
 
 1. 
Teacher 
salaries 
2. Teacher 
experience 
3. Teacher 
education 
4. Teacher 
Race 
(Nonwhite) 
5. Teacher 
in metro 
area 
6. Education 
expenditures 
7. State 
revenue 
8. F/R 
Lunch 
9. CBI 
1. Teacher 
salaries 
 
1         
2. Teacher 
experience 
 
.267** 1        
4. Teacher Race 
(Nonwhite) 
 
-.046* -.106** -.030 1      
5. Teacher in 
metro area 
 
.389** .148** .162** .096** 1     
6. Education 
expenditures 
 
-.045* -.102** -.063** -.167** .232** 1    
7. State revenue 
 
.609** .347** .256** -.036 -.166** -.552** 1   
8. F/R Lunch 
 
 
-.076** -.186** .279** .381** -.394** -.338** .345** 1  
9. CBI 
 
 
.422** .085** .464** -.257** -.055** -.136** .413** .178** 1 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 5: Question 1:  Baseline Model 
  
Dependent Variable: Teacher 
Salaries 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 β Z β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) 534.89 2.32*  61.44 0.45 74.65 0.55 
Teacher Educational 
Attainment 
16067.77 5.95*** 6069.21 4.35*** 5862.69 4.24*** 
Teachers in Metro Area 
(percent) 
 
7837.43 4.74*** 9452.21 8.15*** 9449.38 8.45*** 
Teacher Race (Percent 
Nonwhite) 
 
  -6685.58 -2.84** -5423.60 -2.39* 
Percent of State Education 
Expenditures 
  6100.05 4.55** 6171.07 4.62*** 
State Revenue per Capita    3.72 10.99*** 3.67 11.27*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch 
(Percent) 
 
  493.22 0.37 231.82 0.18 
Collective Bargaining Index    39.70 2.49* 
Collective Bargaining Index 
(squared) 
   -.774 -2.45* 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
.7774 
118.33*** 
0.9273 
346.46*** 
0.9252 
370.64*** 
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Table 6: Question 2:  Twenty Year Comparisons 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Teacher Salaries 1960 - 1980 1980 - 2000 
 β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) -143.17 -1.28 961.41 4.39*** 
Teacher Educational Attainment 5106.66 3.66*** 4763.03 2.84** 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 11711.09 7.78*** 5026.44 5.70*** 
Teacher Race (Percent Nonwhite) -4491.27 -2.53* 3291.90 1.18 
Percent of State Education 
Expenditures 
6294.02 4.15 8374.10 3.61*** 
State Revenue per Capita  4.18 8.43** 2.46 6.63*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) -137.21 -0.11 -2345.82 -1.19 
Collective Bargaining Index 37.88 2.33* 47.02 2.03* 
Collective Bargaining Index (squared) -1.00 -2.65** -.798 -1.78 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
.9606 
327.31*** 
0.9637 
259.95*** 
 133 
Table 7: Question 2:  Decade Effect  
 
  
Dependent Variable: Teacher Salaries 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
 β Z β Z β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) -339.99 -3.90*** 511.11 4.24*** 1094.81 6385*** 362.22 1.95* 
Teacher Educational Attainment 4972.95 6.48*** 2605.37 1.52 7050.44 3.15** 9545.50 4.27*** 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 7775.32 8.56*** 8978.32 7.57*** 3216.67 3.05** 4184.45 4.75*** 
Teacher Race (Percent Nonwhite) -4999.00 -5.43*** 3170.71 1.52 1970.72 1.03 13460.19 7.14*** 
Percent of State Education Expenditures 
 
7486.20 5.01*** 11134.52 4.97*** 4648.33 1.65 14798.12 5.12*** 
State Revenue per Capita  5.66 12.38*** 3.61 7.52*** 3.63 15.61*** 3.33 10.99*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) -1168.72 -0.73 -6636.93 -5.48*** -4546.53 -2.06* -5422.85 -2.99** 
Collective Bargaining Index 28.10 1.35 29.62 1.42 -1.23 -0.06 75.64 3.08** 
Collective Bargaining Index (squared) 
 
-.9720 -1.61 -.9648 -2.14* -.3513 -0.77 -.7570 -1.81 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
.9823 
1044.48*** 
0.9903 
519.89*** 
.9843 
403.13*** 
0.9899 
259.18*** 
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Table 8: Hypothesis 3:  Regional Effect - Northeast 
 
  Dependent Variable: Teacher Salaries New England Middle Atlantic 
 β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) -68.80 -0.35 -856.89 -3.84*** 
Teacher Educational Attainment 2535.51 -0.67 -9039.76 -2.68** 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 3551.66 2.69** 2887.32 1.91 
Teacher Race (Percent Nonwhite) 58685.00 2.14* -106168 -5.51*** 
Percent of State Education Expenditures 
 
5951.06 2.15* 13172.88 4.18*** 
State Revenue per Capita  3.63 6.61*** 10.69 16.17*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) -3581.91 -1.52 -3443.85 -0.79 
Collective Bargaining Index 114.93 1.61 157.45 1.84 
Collective Bargaining Index (squared) 
 
-2.54 -1.54 -3.33 -1.83 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
CBI (Mean) 
.8257 
169.86*** 
26.4 
0.9787 
809.40*** 
25.1 
134 
 135 
Table 9: Hypothesis 3:  Regional Effect - South 
 
Dependent Variable: Teacher Salaries East South Central South Atlantic A South Atlantic B West South Central 
 Β Z β Z β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) -213.89 -0.49 -9.8771 -0.06 29.62 0.14 -1297.48 -5.70*** 
Teacher Educational Attainment 2553.30 0.51 8499.19 2.16* 16937.62 4.63*** -4551.38 -1.22 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 11902.1 3.63*** 17282.53 9.47*** 14258.97 7.73*** 12461.37 5.40*** 
Teacher Race (Percent Nonwhite) -6884..67 -1.65 -13693.83 -3.90*** -29901.53 -3.59*** -10130.26 -1.80 
Percent of State Education Expenditures 
 
8595.22 1.66 10093.6 2.88** 6700.96 1.81 12407.71 2.98** 
State Revenue per Capita  3.70 -1.65 3.83 6.88*** 4.03 8.13*** 5.17 9.89*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) 2344.65 0.89 4996.09 2.42* 525.21 0.25 -5323.45 -2.18* 
Collective Bargaining Index 144.70 2.02* 92.11 3.21** -195.35 -3.06** -46.36 -0.68 
Collective Bargaining Index (squared) 
 
8.54 0.75 1.03 0.15 4.47 2.71** -5.10 -0.60 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
CBI (Mean) 
0.8150 
586.01*** 
-1.67 
0.9451 
502.72*** 
-0.79 
0.9266 
505.51*** 
20.63 
0.9661 
252.74*** 
1.71 
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Table 10: Hypothesis 3:  Regional Effect – Midwest 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Teacher Salaries West North Central East North Central 
 Β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) -7.90 -0.04 -39.28 -0.32 
Teacher Educational Attainment 1202.65 0.67 5937.19 3.19** 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 8202.20 4.37*** 6856.91 3.83*** 
Teacher Race (Percent Nonwhite) 21648.42 2.43* 12137.22 2.93** 
Percent of State Education Expenditures 
 
1560.51 0.61 12577.97 4.17*** 
State Revenue per Capita  1.97 3.81*** 6.07 14.90*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) 2891.95 1.38 -9013.97 -3.82*** 
Collective Bargaining Index 51.24 1.55 70.39 1.50 
Collective Bargaining Index (squared) 
 
-0.84 -1.20 -1.75 -1.89 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
CBI (Mean) 
0.8623 
96.62*** 
21.0 
0.9389 
403.10*** 
22.8 
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Table 11: Hypothesis 3:  Regional Effect - West 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Teacher Salaries Mountain A Mountain B Pacific 
 Β Z β Z β Z 
Teacher Age (years) 337.29 2.68** 1946.56 4.83*** -390.48 -1.28 
Teacher Educational Attainment 5627.47 1.57 19572.81 3.18** 14997.60 5.04*** 
Teachers in Metro Area (percent) 5137.21 3.34** -6256.15 -2.18* 14349.14 4.81*** 
Teacher Race (Percent Nonwhite) 15305.91 1.33 52493.10 1.89 -5501.42 -0.73 
Percent of State Education Expenditures 
 
14162.24 4.08*** -1488.00 -0.30 3229.34 0.63 
State Revenue per Capita  3.23 9.49*** 1.54 1.96* 6.69 11.16*** 
Free and Reduced Lunch (Percent) 4409.69 1.41 -6071.18 -1.57 -12022.57 -3.53*** 
Collective Bargaining Index -271.45 -1.76 68.44 1.41 89.86 1.46 
Collective Bargaining Index (squared) 
 
43.74 2.46* -1.18 -1.20 -2.13 0.08 
R2 
Wald Χ2 
CBI (Mean) 
0.9727 
241.98*** 
3.88 
0.7894 
132.11*** 
24.1 
0.9649 
412.81*** 
28.7 
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework: General Model of Study 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Controlled Variables 
Variable of Interest Dependent Data 
Average Teacher  
Salaries 
Teacher statistics: 
• Race and gender  
• Experience and education  
• Place of work 
 
State demographics 
• School lunch statistics 
• Educational attainment 
• Enrollment percentages 
 
State economics 
• State revenue  
• Education spending in 
relation to other variables 
 
State politics 
• Political control 
• Demographic strength of 
voters 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Provisions 
Historical Time 
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Figure 2: CBI Index For States: Average Index from 1960 to 2000 
 
  
CBI Index: -10 to 0 (No/Few Provisions allowed) 
CBI Index:  1 to 20 (Some provisions allowed) 
CBI Index:  21 to 55 (Several provisions allowed) 
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Figure 3: Regressed Teacher Salaries for States by Collective Bargaining 
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Figure 4: Regressed Teacher Salaries for States by Collective Bargaining Percent Difference 
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Appendix A: 
 
Collective Bargaining Index 
 
Collective Bargaining 
-1 Collective bargaining prohibited 
 0 No provision 
 1 Employer authorized but not required 
 2 Right to present proposals 
 3 Right to meet and confer 
 4 Duty to bargain (implied) 
 5 Duty to bargain (explicit) 
   
Strike Policy  
-2 Prohibited with penalties specified 
 -1 Prohibited with no penalties (discretion of court) 
 0 No provision 
 1 Permitted with qualifications 
   
Right to Work  
0 Has “right to work” laws applying to teachers 
 1 Has no “right to work laws” applying to teachers 
   
Union Scope  
0 No provision 
 1 Excludes compensation 
 2 Includes compensation 
   
Election provisions  
0 No provision 
 1 Nonexclusive allowed or required 
 2 Exclusive; petition and election procedure not specified                                      
 3 Exclusive; petition and election procedure specified 
   
Election Terms  
0 No provision 
 1 Any time after certification 
 2 At least 12 months since last election 
3 At least 12 months since last election and previous collective  
 4 At least 24 months since last election 
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Agency Shop 
 -1 Agency shop prohibited 
 0 No provision 
 1 Agency shop negotiable 
 2 Agency shop compulsory 
   
Union Dues  
0 No provision 
 1 Dues check-off negotiable 
 2 Dues check-off compulsory 
   
Union Shop  
-1 Union shop prohibited 
 0 No provision 
 1 Union shop negotiable 
   
Union Mediation  
0 No provision 
 1 Voluntary 
 2 Discretionary 
 3 Mandatory 
   
Union Fact Finding  
0 No provision 
 1 Voluntary 
 2 Discretionary 
 3 Mandatory 
   
Arbitration Available  
-1 Specifically prohibited 
 0 No provision 
 1 Voluntary 
 2 Discretionary 
 3 Mandatory 
   
Arbitration Scope  
0 No provision 
 1 Issues other than compensation 
 2 All negotiable issues 
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Arbitration Type  
0 No provision 
 1 Conventional 
 2 Final offer - Issue basis 
 3 Final offer - package basis 
 4 Any of these types may be used 
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Appendix B: 
 
Regional Coding based on US Census and Collective Bargaining Index 
 
 
 Regional Classification States 
  
  
Northeast: New England CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT 
  
Northeast: Middle Atlantic NJ, NY, PA 
  
Midwest: East North Central 
 
IN, IL, MI, OH, WI 
  
Midwest: West North Central IO, KS, MN, OK, NE, ND, 
SD 
  
South: South Atlantic A GA, NC, SC, VA, WV 
  
South: South Atlantic B TN, FL, MD, DE 
  
South: East South Central AL, KY, MS,  
  
South: West South Central AR, LA, TX, MO 
  
West: Mountain A AZ, CO, NM, UT, WY 
  
West: Mountain B ID, MT, NV 
  
West: Pacific CA, OR, WA 
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